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Abstract
JEREMY A. COOK: Essays on Teacher Mobility.
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie.)
The allocation of quality teachers across schools is of interest because of both the impor-
tance and costliness of teachers as inputs in the education production process. Furthermore,
because teachers have preferences over their workplace characteristics, this allocation across
schools is nonrandom. This research examines teacher mobility within the school system by fo-
cusing on the school characteristics that a↵ect the probability of teachers leaving their current
schools. Using longitudinal data on public schools in North Carolina, I estimate teacher mobil-
ity probabilities using empirical specifications that incorporate current school characteristics,
as well as characteristics of other potential schools.
I jointly estimate these teacher mobility probabilities with two endogenous teacher creden-
tial outcomes. The joint estimation uses a discrete factor random e↵ects method to control
for both individual permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. Results show that
changes in student demographics have significant e↵ects on one-year mobility probabilities.
These changes in demographics have di↵erent e↵ects across teachers of di↵erent experience
levels, with teachers early in their careers being more sensitive to changes in student charac-
teristics and salary than more experienced teachers. Long run results suggest that providing
beginning teachers with preferred school characteristics may result in a substantial increase in
the number of these teachers remaining in the public school system after five years.
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1 Introduction
The e↵ect of school resources on human capital accumulation is a topic that has been intensely
studied over the past several decades across di↵erent disciplines. While research has shown
that formal schooling is only one component of a complex production process that involves own
ability, family, and peers, it is arguably the component most directly a↵ected by government
legislation and public funding. During the 2008 fiscal year, average state spending on primary
and secondary education comprised 23.6% of total state direct general expenditures.1 Over
the past 50 years, national real spending on public education has increased by an average of
7% annually.
Educational instruction is the most costly school resource by a large margin. In 2008 teacher
salaries and benefits exceeded 55% of all public school expenditures.2 Given the expense of
this resource, it is no surprise that teacher quality and its e↵ect on the academic outcomes
of students is of interest to school administrators, parents, taxpayers, and policy-makers.
Beginning with the 1966 “Coleman Report”, numerous studies have attempted to quantify
the e↵ect of school resources, with special attention to that of teacher quality. Although this
literature is divided over which observable characteristics embody teacher quality, there is a
consensus among recent studies that teacher quality is the most important resource used by
public schools (Hanushek, 1986; Ehrenberg and Brewer, 1994; Rocko↵, 2004).
Much of the current literature treats teacher quality as an exogenous, or randomly deter-
mined, characteristic within a school. However, unlike most other school resources, teachers
have preferences over characteristics of their place of employment, hence the composition of
teachers, and thus teacher quality, is not random across schools. Several studies show that
1National Center for Education Statistics: Digest of Education Statistics: 2010, Table 31
2National Center for Education Statistics: Digest of Education Statistics: 2010, Table A-26-2.
teachers self-select across schools, oftentimes with more highly qualified teachers working at
schools with better resources, lower poverty rates, and fewer minority students (Lankford,
Loeb, and Wycko↵, 2002; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2005). Studies that ignore this non-
random sorting of teachers produce biased estimates of the e↵ect of teacher quality on student
achievement outcomes.
Based on evidence that teachers are important, expensive, and non-randomly placed in-
puts, their mobility between schools is worth studying. The primary goal of this research is
to examine the determinants of teacher mobility. Specifically this study focuses on the stu-
dent, school, and district characteristics that influence teacher movements between schools and
school districts. I use three empirical approaches to examine this mobility. My first approach
uses a multinomial logit model to estimate the mobility probability. This “district level” anal-
ysis restricts the mobility outcome to either stay in the current school, switch to another school
within the same district, switch to another school in a di↵erent district, or leave the school
system.
The second and third empirical approaches expand the mobility outcome to include specific
school selection. These “school level” analyses use a conditional logit framework with specific
schools in the set of mobility alternatives. With these models, regressors vary by alternative,
allowing the characteristics of potential schools to a↵ect the probability of leaving a teacher’s
current school. The second empirical approach uses the entire sample of teachers and does
not allow for unobserved heterogeneity. The third empirical approach controls for unobserved
heterogeneity and uses a subsample of high school teachers from the Piedmont region of North
Carolina. In this model, the set of alternatives includes all high schools in this region.
This research adds to the current literature in several ways. First, I use a dynamic frame-
work to jointly estimate the teacher mobility outcome along with endogenous teacher credential
outcomes over time. These credentials, often associated with teacher quality, include outcomes
for obtaining an advanced degree and becoming certified by the National Board for Profes-
sional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). Teaching experience is also modeled through mobility
and attrition outcomes. Several studies in the literature have focused on these credentials
as signals of, or contributions to, teacher quality. Because unobserved teacher characteristics
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may influence the decision to seek credentials, as well as a↵ect school selection, recovery of
unbiased e↵ects requires joint estimation of these outcomes. In order to reduce possible bias
due to unobserved characteristics in the joint estimation, I use a discrete factor random e↵ects
method that accounts for both individual (teacher) permanent and time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity.
Second, by using a conditional logit framework this research presents a more comprehensive
examination of the determinants of teacher mobility. If teachers are voluntarily leaving their
current school for another school, the arrival school characteristics may play an important
role in that outcome. Specifying the probability of leaving the current school as a function of
both current school characteristics as well as possible future school characteristics introduces
a measure of the “pull” aspect of the arrival school characteristics.
Third, the data I use are longitudinal administrative data on the North Carolina public
school system which include unique information on the non-pecuniary benefits of teaching at a
particular school. The existing literature in this area often uses student characteristics such as
race and poverty level to proxy for poor working conditions. The data I use are supplemented
with a working conditions survey administered to teachers. The survey contains teacher re-
sponses regarding topics such as school safety, administration relationships, and professional
development opportunities. The inclusion of these data help mitigate the potential bias due
to unobserved variables that are correlated with student race and poverty characteristics.
The results of this research show that changes in student demographics have significant
e↵ects on teacher mobility, and that these e↵ects vary across teachers with di↵erent levels of
teaching experience. For example, the results from one model show that an increase in the
proportion of black students of 25 percentage points decreases the probability of a teacher
staying at her current school by up to 2.8 percentage points for teachers with five or fewer
years of experience, compared to 1.4 percentage points for more experienced teachers. These
changes in teacher mobility are one-year transition rates. Over time, these changes in school
characteristics can have a much larger e↵ect on teacher mobility and attrition.
Potentially, biases still remain in the results of this research. These biases arise from the
assumed exogeneity of demand side features of this labor market. In this research I assume
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that a teacher’s employment opportunities, reflected by the discrete alternatives of the mobility
equations, are exogenous. Realistically, the mobility of an individual is constrained by the set
of o↵ers an individual receives. Ignoring these restrictions may result in biased estimates of
mobility probabilities. The potential biases from this assumption are discussed further in
Chapter 7.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in the following structure. Chapter 2
discusses the literature related to teacher mobility and teacher quality. Chapter 3 introduces
the general theoretical motivation for the empirical models. Chapter 4 discusses each of the
empirical specifications used in estimation. Chapter 5 describes the North Carolina data and
the sample of teachers used in the analyses. Chapter 6 presents the estimation results from
these di↵erent models. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of this research, including its
limitations and the potential biases that may be present. It also discusses the direction of
future research. Additional data summaries and all estimated coe cients are included in the
appendix.
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2 Relevant Literature
There are two areas of the education economics literature that relate to my research. The first
area covers teacher mobility. This literature examines the determinants of teacher movement
into the profession, between schools, and attrition from teaching. The second area is teacher
quality, which is concerned with identifying the characteristics that define or a↵ect teacher
quality, and the e↵ect of these characteristics on student achievement.
2.1 Teacher Mobility
2.1.1 Teacher Attrition
Several studies focus on the retention of teachers in the teaching profession. Ingersoll and Smith
(2003) argue that retaining quality teachers is a much more di cult task than recruiting new
teachers. Stinebrickner (2001) uses the NLS-72 to estimate a structural dynamic discrete choice
model of attrition from the teaching profession. He finds that changes in family characteristics
such as marital status and number of children are the most important predictors of attrition.
In addition, he finds that attrition is responsive to wage increases, and that teachers with
better academic traits obtain higher wages in alternative professions. Using the same data
and a competing risks duration specification, Stinebrickner (2002) again finds that attrition
is highly correlated with changes in family structure. He also notes that exit rates out of the
teaching profession are lower than those of non-teachers’ first job. Exit rates out of the labor
force entirely are similar for teachers and non-teachers. Using the NLS-72, van der Klaauw
(1999) also finds salaries and alternative wages influence teacher retention rates. Dolton and
van der Klaauw (1999) use a sample of UK university graduates to examine teacher career
decisions for the first six years of their career. Using a competing risks model they find that
a 10 percent increase in teacher salaries will increase the percentage of these teachers still in
the profession by 5 percentage points.
2.1.2 Mobility within the Profession
Greenberg and McCall (1974), in one of the earliest economic studies to examine teacher
mobility between schools, analyze the one-year (1971-1972) transition of teachers within the
San Diego school system. Using an OLS linear probability model, they estimate the probability
of a teacher leaving her current school. The probability of a teacher transferring from a school
with below-average socio-economic status (SES) was approximately twice the probability of
transferring from a school with average SES. They find that more experienced and more
educated teachers tend to leave schools with low SES characteristics. Teachers moving between
schools tend to move to schools with higher SES characteristics.
Lankford, Loeb, and Wycko↵ (2002), Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wycko↵ (2005) and
Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wycko↵ (2003) examine teacher sorting using administrative data
from the state of New York. In their descriptive study, Lankford, Loeb, and Wycko↵ (2002)
summarize the variation in teacher characteristics across schools and regions from 1985-2000.
They show that di↵erences in teacher qualifications are most prominent at the school level
rather than at the regional level. Among teachers who transition between schools after 1992,
they find that the proportion of minority and poor students at the departing school is between
75 and 100 percent greater than that of the arrival school. They also find that, on average,
teachers who move to a new school have a higher quality skill set than those who stay. Boyd,
Lankford, Loeb, and Wycko↵ (2005) use the same data to investigate teacher preferences over
region. They observe that between the years 1999 - 2002 61 percent of teachers accepted their
first teaching assignment within 15 miles of where they attended high school, and 85 percent
within 40 miles. In addition, they found that teachers were likely to accept jobs in towns with
characteristics similar to their hometown.
Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wycko↵ (2003) employ a two-sided matching model of teachers
and schools using the initial assignments of teachers in five New York metropolitan areas. They
find that teachers with higher qualifications are more likely to be matched with higher wages
and schools with fewer minorities. Their model predicts that an increase in teacher salary of
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1.3 standard deviations would be needed to o↵set the decrease in utility from a 0.46 standard
deviation increase in minority students.
Using Texas administrative data on elementary school teachers, Hanushek, Kain, and
Rivkin (2004) examine the probabilities of teachers moving within or outside of their cur-
rent school district. They find that in order to keep a non-minority teacher from leaving, a
10 percent increase in minority students would require a 10 percent increase in salary. On
average, a 10 percent increase in salary reduced the probability of leaving by approximately
3 percentage points for teachers with five or fewer years of experience. They also find that
salary has a larger influence on switching within Texas schools than it does on leaving Texas
schools.
In a similar study, Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2007) examine teachers in Georgia
public elementary schools. Focusing on new teachers, they estimate a competing risks model
with the options of switching schools/districts, taking an administrative job, taking a job
within Georgia outside the public schools system, or leaving the Georgia labor force. They
find that increasing the proportion of black students by one standard deviation increases the
probability of a teacher leaving by 6.5 percentage points. They also find that black teachers
are less likely to leave schools with a high proportion of minority students than white teachers.
Furthermore, they find only a weak correlation between salary and the probability of leaving
a school, contrasting the results of previous studies.
Jackson (2009) estimates the e↵ect of changes in student demographics on the composition
of teacher characteristics of a school using a natural experiment in one school district in
North Carolina. In 2002, Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools ended their integration-based busing
policy, leading to an immediate change in student demographics within each school. He uses
a di↵erence-in-di↵erences technique along with similar school districts to uncover the causal
e↵ect of these changes on teacher composition. He finds that a 10 percentage point increase in
black students results in a decrease in the average experience level of teachers of 0.8 years. He
also finds that schools with a higher proportion of black students did not have higher teacher
turnover, but did face teachers with lower quality measures.
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2.2 Teacher Quality
One of the most often cited results of James Coleman’s “Equality of Educational Opportunity”
is that peer and family characteristics are far more important than school resources. The
complexity of human capital accumulation combined with the lack of comprehensive data
make valid estimation of each component’s e↵ect di cult (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). In light
of this complexity, measuring the e↵ect of teacher quality has led to a variety of conclusions
in the literature. While the modern literature disagrees on which observable characteristics
signify teacher quality, they do overwhelming agree that teacher quality is the most important
school resource in predicting student outcomes. Hanushek (1986) articulates the inconclusive
results of this literature when he writes that it is “di cult if not impossible to specify a few
objective or subjective characteristics of teachers that capture the systematic di↵erences of
both backgrounds of teachers and their idiosyncratic choices of teaching styles and methods.”
There are severable observable teacher characteristics that have been associated with
teacher quality in the literature. These characteristics usually fall under the categories of
pre-teaching human capital (quality of undergraduate institution, major, GPA, test scores)
and human capital measures obtainable while teaching (experience, master’s degree, nation
board certification, licensure).
Summers and Wolfe (1977) examine a 1970-1971 randomly selected sample of schools and
students from the Philadelphia Public School District. They find a positive correlation between
the selectivity of a teacher’s undergraduate institution and student achievement. Ehrenberg
and Brewer (1994) also come to this conclusion using data from the 1980 High School and
Beyond survey. Ferguson and Ladd (1996) examine the e↵ect of teacher quality at both
the student and aggregate school level. They use Alabama fourth grade students in the 1991
academic year. They find that a one standard deviation in teacher test scores increases student
test scores by 0.1 standard deviations. Their results also show a one standard deviation
increase in the percent of teachers with a masters degree increases student test scores by
0.026 standard deviations. They did not find a significant e↵ect of experience on student
test scores. Goldhaber and Brewer (1997) also find a positive relationship between teachers
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with a masters’ degree in math and student math achievement. Kukla-Acevedo (2009) uses
Kentucky data to analyze the e↵ects of teacher preparation on student outcomes. She finds
the teachers’ undergraduate GPA is a significant predictor of student math scores, with a one
standard deviation increase in math GPA resulting in a 0.385 standard deviation increase in
math scores for minority students.
Several studies provide evidence of a positive correlation between teachers accredited with
the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) and student achievement.
Goldhaber and Anthony (2007) examine data on NBPTS applicants in North Carolina from
1997 to 2000. They find that while the NBPTS accreditation process does not necessarily result
in improved teacher quality, the process does successfully identify applicants who are higher
quality teachers. Successful applicants to the process are shown to have a larger influence
on student achievement than unsuccessful applicants. Using administrative data on a Florida
school district, Cavalluzzo (2004) also found support for NBPTS certification as a signal of
teaching quality. Vandevoort, Amrein-Beardsley, and Berliner (2004) find similar results,
although their sample consists of Arizona teachers, of which only 35 were NBPTS certified.
The most common teacher characteristic found to be significant in the literature is teaching
experience (Kane, Rocko↵, and Staiger, 2008; Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander, 2007; Rivkin,
Hanushek, and Kain, 2005; Ballou and Podgursky, 1997; Loeb and Page, 2000; Rocko↵, 2004).
Both Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) and Rocko↵ (2004) find that the first few years of
teaching experience have a significant e↵ect on student achievement, with the positive e↵ect
diminishing as experience increases.
Several studies conclude that observable teacher characteristics other than experience are
not correlated with student achievement. Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) estimate sev-
eral value-added models using cross-sectional data from the Chicago Public School system.
They find only a weak correlation between teacher observable characteristics such as an ad-
vanced degree and teaching certification with student achievement. Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain (2005) find similar results using Texas administrative data. They find no significant cor-
relation between a teacher’s education credentials. They find a positive correlation between
teaching experience and student achievement, with a larger e↵ect during the first two years of
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teaching.
The e↵ect of school resources on student achievement varies substantially across di↵erent
data and methods. One noticeable di↵erence is between studies using student-level data and
studies aggregating at the school, district, or even state level. Studies that have used aggregate
data tend to find more positive significant correlations between school resources and student
achievement (Card and Krueger, 1992). These correlations tend to be larger than those found
in studies using student level data. Loeb and Bound (1996) and Card and Krueger (1992)
argue that aggregation can reduce measurement error commonly associated with test score
data. Loeb and Bound (1996) also note that aggregation at the school level better accounts
for the entirety of school resources over a students education. Aggregation may also help to
mitigate endogenous sorting of resources between classrooms. If there are omitted variables at
the level of aggregation, such as di↵erences in state policies, aggregation can increase omitted-
variable bias (Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor, 1996). Aggregation is likely to lead to greater
bias in estimated marginal e↵ects of inputs if those inputs are endogenous. For example,
average teacher quality at a school is likely correlated with unobserved teacher preferences.
None of these papers attempting to measure the e↵ects take into account the endogeneity of
teacher location.
10
3 Theoretical Motivation
3.1 Teacher Decisions
The theoretical framework described in this section provides the motivation for the empirical
model to follow. This framework provides a description of the relationship and timing of
teacher movements between schools as well as the teacher credential decisions. These credential
decisions are important to model because teachers with a desire to move to a high quality school
may also be more motivated to improve their credentials. In labor economic theory employee
credentials such as degrees and certifications are observable traits that signal productivity to
potential employers. In the labor market for teachers these credentials may serve as observable
signals of teaching quality. Subsequently, teachers with a better portfolio of credentials may
have greater access to better schools.
The literature identifies several teacher characteristics that are associated with teacher
quality. Three of these characteristics are included in this model: education, NBPTS cer-
tification, and teaching experience. In each period teachers can become credentialed in the
following areas: complete a master’s degree (q1it), and/or become NBPTS certified (q2it).
These credential decisions define the teacher’s observed set of credentials: degreed (Q1it) and
national board certified (Q2it) entering each period t.1 The individual’s teaching experience
(Q3it) entering period t is defined as the number of completed years taught.2
1These stock variables are binary variables updated the year the credential is obtained and remain at that
value for the duration of a teacher’s career. For example Q1it = 1 if the teacher obtained a master’s degree in
any previous period.
2Due to the nature of administrative data I have limited information on the timing of credential decisions.
Because of this limitation I am unable to observe and model the length of time required to obtain teacher
credentials. I am only able to observe the outcome of the decision. For example, I am unable to observe
the accumulation of credits needed to obtain a master’s degree or when the decision was made to begin a
master’s degree program. I only observe the successful outcome of the decision, which is the date the degree
was completed. Similarly, I am unable to observe schools to which a teacher applies, job o↵ers, or application
rejections. I am only able to observe the outcome if a teacher does decide to move to another school.
Consistent with labor economics theory, the representative teacher receives utility from
both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of a teaching position. In this model teacher
i derives utility in period t from consumption (cit), and leisure (`it), as well as the school
characteristics (Sit) at the school she is employed. The contemporaneous utility is a↵ected by
preference shifters of observed exogenous time-invariant characteristics (Xi) and an unobserved
component (uit).
Uit = U(cit, `it, Sit, uit;Xi) (3.1)
Total consumption (cit) is constrained by income (Iit) when teaching (hit > 0) minus the price
(p) of completing a master’s degree.3
cit = 1I[hit > 0] ⇤ Iit   pt ⇤ q1it (3.2)
Teaching income is a function of a teacher’s credentials (Qit) and current school characteristics
(Sit).
Iit = I(Qit, Sit) (3.3)
A teacher’s total time in each period (⌦) is divided between hours teaching (hit), leisure (`it),
and time required to obtain credentials (⌧q1 , ⌧q2).
⌦ = hit + `it + ⌧q1q1it + ⌧q2q2it (3.4)
Given the constraint on consumption and time, the utility for period t becomes:
Uit = U( I(Qit, Sit)  ptq1it, ⌦  hit   ⌧q1q1it   ⌧q2q2it, Sit, uit; Xi) (3.5)
The traditional academic school year defines one period in this model. In North Carolina,
as in many other states, employment opportunities and transitions between schools are made
almost uniformly based on the academic year. This framework, summarized for teacher i in
3I do not include other forms of income because they are not observable in the data.
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Figure 1, uses the following timing assumptions:
1. The teacher enters the period with knowledge of the state variables (Zit) which include
her credentials (Qit), individual characteristics (Xi), current school characteristics (Sit),
non-school community characteristics (P st ), the price and prevalence of credentials (P
Q
t )
and preference shifter uit.
2. In the first stage of the period, she chooses whether or not to obtain the following
credentials: complete a master’s degree (q1it) and become NBPTS certified (q2it). These
decisions, along with current experience, update her stock of credentials.
3. Given the updated credentials, the teacher receives a set of employment o↵ers (Snt) from
the set of all possible o↵er sets (St). This set of o↵ers is unobserved by the researcher.
4. At the end of the period, the teacher makes a decision (mit) of whether to leave her
current school for a di↵erent school within her set of o↵ers (mit = 1) or to stay at her
current school (mit = 0).
Figure 3.1: Timing of Behavior
-
Begin period t
Information
entering t:
Zt = (Qt, Xt, St, Pt, ut)
q1t, q2t
Credential
decisions
Snt
Set of job o↵ers
(unobserved)
mt
School switching
decision
Begin period t+ 1
Information
entering t+ 1:
Zt+1 = (Qt+1, Xt+1, St+1, Pt+1, ut+1)
The set of o↵ers, denoted Snt, is the nth o↵er set from the set of all possible o↵er sets,
St. The outside option contained in the o↵er set Snt represents possible teaching or non-
teaching employment opportunities outside of North Carolina public schools or leaving the
labor the labor force altogether. The probability of a teacher facing an o↵er set of Snt is
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a function of a teacher’s updated credentials and experience (Qt+1), as well as the current
school of employment and its characteristics. This set of o↵ers, while a function of observable
credentials, is not deterministic. At the beginning of the period, the teacher does not know
with certainty the o↵er set she will receive until after she makes the credential decisions. The
probability of receiving a set of o↵ers Snt 2 St is denoted ⇡St . The o↵er set is realized only
after the credential decisions are made. There is also a probability of being laid-o↵ in the next
period. Let the probability of being laid-o↵ in the next period be denoted  t+1.
Upon receiving a set of job o↵ers Snt the teacher makes the decision whether to stay or
leave her current school. The individual makes this decision each period until she chooses
the outside option (i.e. attrit from the sample). The lifetime value of choosing a particular
credentials combination q = (q1, q2) at the beginning of period t conditional on being in school
s is:
V sq (Zt, ✏t) = Uit +  W (Zt+1) 8t (3.6)
where
W (Zt+1) =  t+1
X
S
0
n2S0
⇡S
0
t+1Et[ max
s02S0nt+1
V s
0
(Zt+1)]+(1  t+1)
X
S
00
n2S00
⇡S
00
t+1Et[ max
s002S00nt+1
V s
00
(Zt+1)] 8t
(3.7)
and
V s(Zt+1) = Et[max
q
V sq (Zt+1, ✏t+1)] 8s, 8t (3.8)
is the maximal expected value of lifetime utility at the beginning of period t+1, unconditional
on the subsequent credentials decision but conditional on the employment decision. Note that
expression (3.7) captures both the uncertainty of layo↵ as well as the optimal employment
decision among a set of uncertain potential o↵ers. The set of o↵ers S0nt would exclude con-
tinuation at one’s current school s; The set of o↵ers S00nt would include the option to stay at
school s. Both sets include the outside option. The value function in equation (3.6) signifies
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that when the teacher makes certification decisions at the beginning of each period there is
uncertainty about the future value of those decisions because of the stochastic nature of the
employment o↵ers.
Teacher decisions of credentials and school choice determine the composition of teacher
characteristics at a given school in two ways. First, teachers that stay at the current school
could update their credentials, changing the composition of teacher characteristics. Second,
the flow of teachers in and out of a school changes the composition of teacher characteristics
at that school.
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4 Empirical Model
4.1 Teacher Outcomes
Using the theoretical framework, I form approximations of the demand functions for the two
credential decisions made at the beginning of the period, along with the end-of-period em-
ployment decision, using the theory to inform the arguments of those functions. This chapter
outlines the empirical specifications of three di↵erent approaches to the treatment of the end-
of-period mobility decision. The first approach analyzes the mobility outcome at the district
level, while the second and third approaches use a school-specific mobility outcome. In each
of these approaches, the set of o↵ers (S) described in the previous chapter is assumed to be
exogenous. In other words, the empirical estimation does not explicitly model the possibility
that many teachers may not be able to move to a school with their preferred characteristics
due to demand side restrictions. Chapter 7 includes further discussion of the limitations of
this assumption, as well as possible ways future research may alleviate the biases resulting
from this assumption.
4.2 District Level Mobility
This empirical specification is motivated by the teacher decision outlined in the theoretical
framework. These decisions produce two credential outcomes as well as the mobility outcome
at the end of the period.
The credential outcomes are the result of the decisions to complete a master’s degree (q1it),
and/or become national board certified (q2it). The probabilities of each of these outcomes
are specified as discrete-time hazard models, where a teacher-year observation is included in
estimation of the probabilities every period until the specific certification is obtained.1 Once
a teacher acquires the credential her stock of that credential is updated, and that specific
credential is no longer a decision in future periods.
Each of these certification probabilities is a function of vectors describing the credentials
history (Qit) of a teacher entering the period. This vector includes certification outcomes
observed in the previous period as well as the stock of certifications a teacher has when entering
the current period. The certification probabilities are also a function of a vector of exogenous
teacher characteristics (Xit), a vector of school-level and district-level characteristics (Sit), a
vector of exogenous community variables (PSit ) that describe the non-school characteristics of
the community and a vector of exogenous credential variables (PQit ) that describe the costs
and incentives related to obtaining these credentials.
In the empirical model, I decompose the error term uit for each equation into three com-
ponents: individual permanent heterogeneity (µt), individual time-varying heterogeneity (⌫it),
and an identical and independently distributed type I extreme value component (✏it). That is,
uit = µi + ⌫it + ✏it (4.1)
Conditional on the correlated error components, the i.i.d. error component (✏it) produces logit
probabilities of the credential outcomes. Equations (4.2) and (4.3) express the probabilities of
the observed credential outcomes that are simultaneously made during the period.
The log odds ratio of obtaining a master’s degree:
ln

Pr(q1it = 1 | Q1it = 0)
Pr(q1it = 0 | Q1it = 0)
 
=  0 +  1Q2it +  2Q3it +  3Xit
+  4Sit +  5P
Q
it +  6P
S
it + µ1i + ⌫1it
(4.2)
1Applicants for NBPTS certification are required to have at least three years of teaching experience. Ac-
cordingly, individuals with less than three years of experience are excluded from the NBPTS hazard model.
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The log odds ratio of becoming national board certified:
ln

Pr(q2it = 1 | Q2it = 0, Q3it   3)
Pr(q2it = 0 | Q2it = 0, Q3it   3)
 
=  0 +  1Q1it +  2Q3it +  3Xit
+  4Sit +  5P
Q
it +  6P
S
it + µ2i + ⌫2it
(4.3)
Each of these probabilities is estimated as a discrete-time duration model. Note that
each equation is conditional upon not having previously obtained that credential. The vector
containing the history of that credential is omitted due to absence of variation. For example,
the degree equation is estimated for only those individuals who do not already have an advanced
degree, meaning their history of that credential would be zero for all observations.
As outlined with the theoretical motivation in the previous chapter, the beginning-of-period
credential decisions update the teacher’s stock of credentials. These updated credentials could
influence the movement of teachers between schools in two ways. First, teachers aspiring to
achieve these credentials may be more inclined to seek out “better” schools at which to teach.
Second, these credentials are observable signals of teacher quality and may influence the quality
of job o↵ers received by a teacher. Given this influence, the end-of-period school employment
decision (mit) is a function of these updated stock variables (Qit+1). It is also conditional on
not choosing the outside option, which in these data equate with attrition from the sample.
The data do not contain information on the reason for an individual leaving the data. An
individual observed in the data one year and not observered in the data the next year could
leave the public school system for a variety of unidentified reasons. For example, a teacher
could retire, leave the state, leave the teaching profession, or leave public schools for a position
at a private school. In order to account for the possibility of nonrandom attrition, I model
this attrition with a binary variable (ait) indicating the last period an individual is observed.
The log odds ratio of attrition at the end of period t is
ln

Pr(ait = 1)
Pr(ait = 0)
 
= ⌘0 + ⌘1Q1it+1 + ⌘2Q2it+1 + ⌘3Q3it+1 + ⌘4Xit
+ ⌘5Sit + ⌘6P
S
it + µ3i + ⌫3it
(4.4)
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I define the end-of-period employment decision (mit), conditional on not attritting (ait =
0),to include three options:
m =
8><>:
0 stay at current school,
1 move to di↵erent school in same district,
2 move to di↵erent school in di↵erent district.
The log odds ratio of changing schools relative to staying at the current school is
ln

Pr(mit = m) | ait = 0
Pr(mit = 0) | ait = 0
 
=  m0 +  
m
1 Q1it+1 +  
m
2 Q2it+1 +  
m
3 Q3it+1 +  
m
4 Xit
+  m5 Sit +  
m
6 P
S
it + µ
m
4i + ⌫
m
4it m = 1, 2
(4.5)
Note that the vector of exogenous variables (PQit ) that shift demand for credentials is not
included in equations (4.4) and (4.5). I assume that the current level (period t) of these
variables a↵ect the mobility outcome only through the updated credential stock variables
(i.e., PQit has no e↵ect on the employment decision conditional upon the updated stock of
credentials).
4.3 Estimation Technique
I jointly estimate equations (4.2) through (4.5) by allowing these equations to be correlated
through the permanent (µi) and time-varying (⌫it) error components. Researchers commonly
allow for this correlation to exist through distributional assumptions, such as joint normality,
about the error terms. If the distributional assumptions are incorrect the resulting parameters
will be biased. I use a more flexible semi-parametric estimation method that relaxes these
distributional assumptions. The discrete factor random e↵ects method (DFRE), based on
Heckman and Singer (1984), approximates the joint cumulative distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity components using a discrete step-wise function (Mroz and Guillkey, 1995; Mroz,
1999). This method determines the points of support along the distribution as well as the
probability of being at each point. The location and probabilities of these mass points are
parametrically estimated along with the other model coe cients in the likelihood function.
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The DFRE method is preferred to other common panel data approaches such as first di↵er-
ences or fixed e↵ects for several reasons. First, the DFRE controls for two types of unobserved
heterogeneity: individual permanent and time-varying heterogeneity, whereas common meth-
ods only capture individual permanent heterogeneity. Secondly, unlike fixed e↵ects methods,
the DFRE method allows for the use of time-invariant regressors. Thirdly, within estimators
rely heavily on within individual variation of time-varying regressors. Because of this reliance,
lack of variation or the presence of measurement error can increase attenuation bias when using
these other estimators (Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz, 1998). Mroz and Guillkey (1995) show
using Monte Carlo simulations that the DFRE outperforms parametric maximum likelihood
methods when the distributional assumptions of the econometrician are incorrect.
4.4 Identification and Initial Conditions
The empirical equations set forth are estimated as a system of equations, with the the en-
dogenous outcomes of the credential decisions used as regressors in the moving decisions. The
empirical model attains identification from theoretical exclusion restrictions and the nonlinear
dynamic nature of the equations.
Valid exclusion restrictions need to influence the endogenous outcomes of master’s degree
and NBPTS certification without a↵ecting the moving decision, conditional on the credentials
obtained in the period. The North Carolina DPI sets a salary schedule each year that deter-
mines the salary of a teacher given her experience and credentials. While districts may choose
to pay teacher salaries above this schedule, these levels are the minimum amounts that must
be paid to teachers set forth by the state. Based upon these state salary schedules a teacher
increases her income based on her education attainment and NBPTS status. The additional
amount earned based on these two credentials vary across the experience level of a teacher. In
each period experience level varies across teacher, and subsequently these increases in income
vary across both teacher and time. Because these salary increases are set at the state level and
apply to all school districts, they should influence the credential decision but not the moving
decision. I use these state salary schedule di↵erentials to help identify the per-period decisions
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of whether to obtain a master’s degree and NBPTS certification. Additionally, I use average
in-state tuition levels within the county for identification. In-state tuition levels vary across
time and across individuals in di↵erent counties. 2
Identification of parameters also comes through the dynamic nature and functional form of
the model. Bhargava (1991) shows that, under weak conditions in linear dynamic models, each
lag of the exogenous time-varying variables has an e↵ect on the current endogenous variable.
The degree of identification has been shown to be even greater in nonlinear dynamic models
(Mroz and Surette, 1998; Mroz and Savage, 2006). In this sense, the entire history of exogenous
time-varying variables act as instruments for endogenous variables in the current period.3
The administrative data are left-censored in regards to teachers being at di↵erent points in
their career in the first year a teacher is observed. The first year of observed data, 1995, has
teachers with a range of teacher experience, and levels of credentials. Also, teachers observed
in later years can enter the sample from a position outside of the public school system, and
have a range of experience and levels of credentials. These initial levels in the first observed
period for an individual cannot be modeled in a dynamic framework because there are no
observed lagged values available as regressors. This leads to the problem of endogenous initial
conditions. In order to explain the variation in these initial levels I model these endogenous
variables with reduced form equations.
Identification of these reduced form equations comes through variables that explain these
initial levels but do not influence the per-period outcomes. Reduced form equations are es-
timated for four initial conditions: master’s degree, national board certification, teaching
experience, and the quality of school at which a teacher is initially observed. In order to model
the initial school quality of a teacher I create a trichotomous index of low, medium, and high
quality based on observable school quality characteristics. The exclusion restrictions used need
to influence these initial levels without influencing the later outcomes conditioned on the initial
2As evident in the appendix, these instruments are statistically significant in the credential equations. Fur-
thermore, when included in the mobility equation, a likelhood ratio test failed to reject the null hypothesis of
joint significance at the 10% level.
3Cameron and Trivedi (2005) also show how these exogenous variables from other periods serve as instruments
in their discussion on GMM estimation of panel models.
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endogenous value.
Identification for initially observed values for master’s degree, national board certification
status, experience, and school quality comes from several variables. These variables include
historic salary schedules for teachers in North Carolina that identify di↵erentials in salary
across certifications and the unemployment rate at the time an individual received her first
bachelor’s degree. The unemployment rate captures economic variation that may influence
teaching opportunities as well as opportunities outside the teaching profession. Identification
also comes from changes in teaching license requirements in North Carolina beginning in 1959.4
Based upon the year an individual received her first bachelor’s degree the teaching require-
ments such as required testing, required scoring, and specialization are di↵erent. I categorize
teachers into eight di↵erent time periods based on these changing requirements. Identification
of these initial conditions also comes from indicator variables representing the region in which
an individual received her first bachelor’s degree. The rationale for this identification variable
is that teachers from colleges outside of North Carolina may have di↵erent barriers to obtaining
a position within the North Carolina public school system.5
The set of variables that is excluded from the per-period questions are included in each
of the initial condition equations. In order to correctly model the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity the five reduced form initial condition equations are jointly estimated with the
per-period equations. Accordingly, the individual permanent component of the unobserved
heterogeneity (µi) is allowed to be correlated across the initial conditions as well as the per-
period equations. The individual time-varying component of the unobserved heterogeneity
(⌫it) is not included in the initial conditions.
4.5 The Likelihood Function
The discrete factor random e↵ects method approximates the continuous distributions of the
unobserved heterogeneity components using K mass points for µk and G mass points for ⌫gt.
4License Certification Requirements, All Fifty States, [serial] 1959-2008.
5Conditional upon the initial endogenous value, these exclusion restrictions were found to be jointly insignifi-
ant in the per-period equations using a likelihood ratio test.
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The method estimates ⇢k which is the joint probability of the kth permanent mass point and
 g which is the joint probability of the gth time-varying mass point.
The unconditional contribution of individual i to the likelihood function for the per-period,
initial conditions, and attrition outcomes is:
Li(⇥, ⇢, ) =
KX
k=1
⇢k
(
1Y
q1=0
Pr(Q11 = q1 | µ5k)1I{Q1i1=q1}
1Y
q2=0
Pr(Q21 = q2 | µ6k)1I{Q2i1=q2}1I{Q3i1>3}
1
 
 (lnQ31 | µ7k)
3Y
s=1
Pr(S1 = s | µs8k)1I{Si1=s}
TY
t=1
GX
g=1
 g
 1Y
q1=0
Pr(q1t = q1 | µ1k, ⌫1tg, Q1it = 0)1I{q1it=q1}1I{Q1it=0}
1Y
q2=0
Pr(q2t = q2 | µ2k, ⌫2tg, Q2it = 0)1I{q2it=q2}1I{Q2it=0}1I{Q3it>3}
1Y
a=0
Pr(at = a | µ3k, ⌫3tg)1I{ait=a}
2Y
m=0
Pr(mt = m | µm4k, ⌫m4tg)1I{mit=m}1I{ait=0}
 )
(4.6)
The respective joint probabilities of the permanent and time-varying mass points are given by
equations (4.7) and (4.8):
⇢k = Pr(µ1 = µ1k, µ2 = µ2k, µ3 = µ3k, µ
0
4 = µ
0
4k, µ
1
4 = µ
1
4k, µ
2
4 = µ
2
4k, µ5 = µ5k,
µ6 = µ6k, µ7 = µ7k, µ
1
8 = µ
1
8k, µ
2
8 = µ
2
8k, µ
3
8 = µ
3
8k)
(4.7)
 g = Pr(⌫1 = ⌫1g, ⌫2 = ⌫2g, ⌫3 = ⌫3g, ⌫
0
4 = ⌫
0
4g, ⌫
1
4 = ⌫
1
4g, ⌫
2
4 = ⌫
2
4g) (4.8)
The joint likelihood function over all individuals is given by:
L(⇥) =
NY
i=1
Li(⇥, ⇢, ) (4.9)
The likelihood function is maximized with respect to the parameters in the outcome equa-
tions, as well as the unobserved heterogeneity components µk, ⌫g, ⇢k, and  g.
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4.6 School Level Mobility
The empirical model presented in the previous section of this chapter treats the mobility
outcome of the teacher as a function of current school characteristics. Specifically, the outcome
of the mobility equation (4.5) has a multinomial logit specification. This trichotomous outcome
indicating the mobility of a teacher restricts the categories to whether the teacher stays at
her current school, moves to a new school in the same district, or moves to a new school
in a di↵erent district. At this level of analysis, the characteristics of the departing school
are used, while the arrival school characteristics are not used. Since only the current school
characteristics enter the equation as regressors, the estimated probability of switching schools
is not a function of employment opportunities at other schools. E↵ectually, this specification
captures only the “push” aspect of current school characteristics.
Inherently, when an individual contemplates the decision to leave a job, he/she weighs the
utility received at the current job versus the utility at a potential new job. Analogously, the
teacher considers the characteristics of the potential future school when deciding whether to
leave his/her current school. Incorporating this “pull” aspect of other schools requires the
probability of switching schools be a function of the characteristics of those other schools.
A conditional logit model is a more appropriate empirical specification when the choice of
an individual is dependent upon the characteristics of each alternative. This model di↵ers from
the standard multinomial logit model in that conditional model regressors vary by alternative.
Also, unlike a multinomial logit model where each regressor has a di↵erent coe cient for each
outcome, the conditional logit outcomes share a common parameter for each characteristic. 6
The timeline of Figure (3.1) has an individual making a mobility decision (mt) at the end
of the period. Let this decision be a choice of school s among S schools. Consider a conditional
logit specification with each discrete outcome representing a specific school. The probability
of selecting school sj is a function of school sj characteristics, as well as the characteristics
of all other schools in S. Let Sj represent a vector of school characteristics for school sj , and
6See Wooldridge (2001) or Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for further discussion regarding these discrete out-
come models.
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X
Sj
i represent a vector of alternative-invariant individual characteristics of teacher i interacted
with school characteristics Sj . These individual characteristics include the credential stock and
personal characteristics in the previous specification. In addition to the school characteristics
used in the previous specification, the vector of alternative-varying characteristics includes an
indicator variable representing the current school of the teacher. This vector also includes the
distance in miles from the teacher’s current school to each alternative. These two variables are
used to assist in explaining the barrier of leaving the current school for another alternative.
The average salary at each school is used as an approximation of the salary a teacher could
potentially earn if that school alternative were selected by the teacher. An i.i.d. extreme value
error component produces the logit probability of choosing a specific school sj from a set of
alternatives S:
Pr(mit = sj) =
exp (↵1Sj + ↵2X
Sj
i )P
h2S exp (↵1Sh + ↵2X
Sh
i )
(4.10)
The relative probabilities of choosing one school over another can also be expressed as a
log odds ratio. Note that the relative probability of choosing one school over another school is
a function of the di↵erences in alternative characteristics. The empirical equation in log odds
of choosing school sj relative to another school sk:
ln

Pr(mit = sj)
Pr(mit = sk)
 
= ↵1(Sj   Sk) + ↵2(XSji  XSki ) (4.11)
Estimating equation (4.10) for each school in the sample would require a model with
approximately 2000 discrete outcomes for each individual. Given this large number of alter-
natives, and the number of individuals in the sample, estimating (4.10) is computationally
burdensome. One method of reducing the computational cost of this model is to reduce the
number of alternatives in the choice set of individuals. The following two empirical approaches
of this research use di↵erence specifications to reduce this burden.
4.6.1 Random Sampling of Alternatives
McFadden (1978) describes a method to randomly sample a choice set when using the entire set
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of alternatives is infeasible. This random sampling approach has been used in discrete choice
applications involving recreational sites, utility demand, and residential location (Parsons and
Kealy, 1992; Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva, 1987; Liu, Mroz, and van der Klaauw, 2010).
Let K ✓ S, where K is a subset of schools in the full set of schools S. Let q(K|sj) represent
the probability that subset K is drawn given that alternative sj is selected.
If the researcher assigns an unequal probability for each subset of alternatives given the
selected alternative then the choice probability is altered to include an alternative-specific
correction term added to the representative utility. This correction term accounts for the bias
caused by the random sampling of alternatives. During estimation the parameter for this term
is constrained to one. Letting Vj represent the indirect utility of choosing sj , McFadden (1978)
shows that under the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property the probability
of choosing alternative sj given the choice set K becomes:
Pr(mi = sj | K) = exp(Vj + ln q(K | sj))P
k2K exp(Vk + ln q(K | sk))
(4.12)
When the the probability of entering the choice set is equal for each of the non-chosen alter-
natives, McFadden (1978) shows that under the uniform conditioning property the alternative
specific correction terms cancel in the choice probability. This property leads to estimation
that is the same as the standard conditional logit.7
The specification in equation (4.11) contains only regressors which vary by alternative.
A specification which includes both alternative-varying and alternative-invariant regressors
is commonly referred to as a mixed logit model. Similar to a multinomial logit model, the
alternative-invariant regressors of a mixed logit model have a unique coe cient for each alterna-
tive. Each of these coe cients represent the di↵erent e↵ect the alternative-invariant regressor
has on the probability of each specific alternative. For example, teacher gender would have a
7Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (2003) provide a more thorough discussion of McFadden (1978)
and applications.
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unique coe cient for each school alternative, which represents the di↵erent e↵ect on the prob-
ability of selecting each school alternative. In the context of random sampling a set of alterna-
tives, the interpretation of alternative-specific parameters for alternative-invariant regressors
is less clear. The coe cients, although consistent, are determined from the randomly sampled
set of alternatives. In this case, there is not a specific coe cient estimated for each specific
alternative from the entire set of alternatives, but rather, the randomly sampled alternative
sets which vary across individuals. In estimation, the kth alternative for individual i could
be di↵erent from the kth alternative for individual j. The resulting coe cient for alternative
k cannot be associated with a specific school, but rather only the kth alternative. Therefore,
alternative-invariant regressors are avoided by interacting these alternative-invariant regressors
with alternative-varying regressors. Likewise, estimating a conditional logit equation jointly
with other equations using a DFRE method with alternative-invariant unobserved heterogene-
ity components produces unintuitive e↵ects of these components for each randomly sampled
alternative. For this reason, I estimate the choice probabilities from equation (4.10) with a
conditional logit model that is not jointly estimated with the credential equations outlined in
the previous section. Without modeling the unobserved heterogeneity, I only recover biased
estimates of the e↵ect of endogenous credentials. With this model, estimation uses 20 ran-
domly selected schools for the set of alternatives, including the school chosen by the teacher.
The probability of entering the choice set is equal for each non-chosen alternative.
4.6.2 Subsample of Teachers
In order to allow for unobserved heterogeneity, the final empirical approach of this dissertation
reduces the computational burden of a conditional logit model through limiting the sample of
individuals, and subsequently, reducing the set of alternatives. For this specification, I use a
regionally-specific sample of teachers who move only within this regional set of schools. Each
teacher faces the same set of alternatives, and I assume they consistently choose from this set
of alternatives each period. This subsample of individuals consists of teachers from 70 high
schools in the central Piedmont region of North Carolina. Further description of this sample
is included in the next chapter.
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I estimate the conditional logit equation jointly with the credential, attrition, and initial
conditions equations using the DFRE method each described in section 4.3. With this ap-
proach, the computational burden is reduced, and the equivocal interpretation of heterogeneity
terms for randomly sampled alternatives is avoided. The mobility probability equation at the
end of the period includes the 70 schools as discrete alternatives. Accordingly, the mobility
outcome established in equation (4.5) is altered to include the subset of alternatives.
ln

Pr(mit = sj)
Pr(mit = sk)
 
=  1(Sj   Sk) +  2(XSji  XSki ) + µj3i + ⌫j3it j 6= k, j = 1, ..., 70 (4.13)
Equation (4.13) is correlated with equations (4.2) through (4.3) through the individual
permanent (µj4i) and time-varying (⌫
j
4it) heterogeneity components. As in the previous spec-
ification, the joint distribution of µ and ⌫ is estimated using a discrete factor random e↵ects
method. In equation (4.13) the unobserved heterogeneity type is allowed to enter with a dif-
ferent marginal e↵ect for each alternative. In this respect, the specification contains both
alternative-invariant parameters for the regressors (Sj , XSj ) as well as alternative-varying pa-
rameters representing the marginal e↵ect of each unobserved type on the probability of choosing
an alternative.
The segment of the likelihood function of equation (4.6) representing the contribution of
the mobility outcome is altered to include the choice of school from the subset of 70 alternatives
as follows:
70Y
j=1
Pr(mt = sj | µj3k, ⌫j3tg)1I{mit=sj} (4.14)
Estimation results using these specifications are discussed in Chapter 6.
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5 Data
5.1 Description
The data I use are from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC).
These data are compiled annually from the administrative records of the North Carolina
Department of Public Instruction (DPI). The DPI records include data on the universe of
districts, schools, teachers, and students in the North Carolina public school system from
1995 to 2007. These data provide a comprehensive view of the public school system, allowing
teachers to be followed throughout their transition within the system. Information on teachers
includes gender, race, educational attainment, college and graduation year, NBPTS certifica-
tion, state-based salary and total teaching experience. The education and certification data
include information on the date the degree or certification was awarded.
In order to supplement the NCERDC information on teachers, I use additional data describ-
ing the undergraduate institution of the teacher from the Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. Department
of Education. These variables include indicators for the Carnegie classifications of whether a
college is privately funded, a research university, o↵ers graduate degrees, and is a historically
black college. I also use supplemental data on the selectivity of the teacher’s undergraduate in-
stitution. The Barrons’ Admissions Competitiveness Index from the NCES provide indicators
for the competitiveness of undergraduate institutions in the U.S. This index is represented by
indicators for the competitiveness category of the institution. From these data I use indicators
for the categories “most competitive”, “highly competitive”, and “very competitive”. The
NCES provides this index for years 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2004. I merge this index with the
teacher data using the year closest to that of the teacher’s year of undergraduate completion.
Table B.1 summarizes the variables describing teachers. The collective data on a teacher’s
undergraduate institution provide an approximation of academic ability as well as controls for
di↵erent types of individuals.1
Data on schools include standard demographics of students such as race, students eligible
for free or reduced lunch, size of the student body, and student-teacher ratio. The data also
include geographic indicators for urban or rural classification. In addition to data from the
DPI, the NCERDC also houses survey results from the North Carolina Professional Teaching
Standards Commission (NCPTSC). Beginning in 2002, the NCPTSC biennially administers
a working conditions survey to all certified school personnel in the state. These surveys are
anonymously administered within schools, which eliminates the possibility of linking them
with specific teacher data. Although these survey results are subjective teacher perceptions of
school quality, they provide a unique measure of the non-pecuniary benefits that are di cult
to observe in standard administrative data used in the existing literature. I use responses
from eight questions pertaining to the non-pecuniary benefits of working at a school. These
questions include topics such as school safety, work load, and professional development. Ta-
ble A.1 contains descriptions of these questions. Each question used is a five-point Likert
item with possible responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. I average
these responses within schools and then classify schools into quartiles, with a higher quartile
representing a more positive average response.
The NCERDC data contain financial information at the district level. From these data I
construct variables for the percent of total revenue that comes from local sources, local revenue
per student, expenditures per student, average teacher salary supplement, and the percentage
of teachers receiving salary supplements. Based on the observed data, I create variables for the
number of school openings and school closings within a district. The addition or subtraction
of schools within an area provides opportunities for teacher transitions. I also create indicator
variables for districts on the border of the state. These border states include South Carolina,
Georgia, Tennessee, and Virginia. Teachers working in school districts on the border may be
1In reality, the competitiveness of an undergraduate institution is endogenous. Modeling this endogeneity is
not feasible in the model, and since I am only using this index to proxy for ability, I argue that modeling this
endogeneity is not needed.
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more a↵ected by policy changes or school employment opportunities in border states, thus
having a higher attrition rate from the data. School, district, community characteristics, and
exclusion restrictions are summarized in Table B.2.
5.2 Sample Selection
The focus of my analysis is on the outcomes of the standard classroom teacher. The NCERDC
Personnel Files include all classroom and non-classroom activities for public school employees
with direct contact with students. I use these records to identify employees with a teaching
assignment involving classroom activity. I further limit the sample by keeping only full-time
teachers that are observed in the data to be matched with only one school each year. Full-time
teachers with classroom activity that are observed at multiple schools during a single academic
year are dropped from the sample.2
Figure 5.1 represents a histogram of years of teaching experience in the sample. Although
this histogram provides a description of the school system over a specific period of time, the
decreasing height of the bins roughly measures the rate of attrition across teaching experience.
There is a large mass of teachers with fewer than five years of teaching experience. The large
drop in teaching experience suggests high attrition within the first few years teaching. This
attrition decreases near 15 years of experience, where we see a constant percentage of teachers
across these middle years of experience. The proportion of individuals in the sample with 28
or more years of experience decreases substantially at each additional year of experience. This
decrease is most likely due to the range of retirement benefit age requirements based on an
individual’s age and state employment history.
2These individuals represent less than 3% of all teachers in the data. This figure oftentimes represent teachers
with specialty assignments. For example, a school district may have a science teacher that teaches a science
module at several middle schools within the district.
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Figure 5.1: Teaching Experience
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Figures 5.2 and 5.3 display the teacher outcomes across years of experience for the creden-
tials and mobility, respectively. Teachers with fewer years of experience obtain an advanced
degree at a greater frequency than other teachers. This percentage peaks at four years of ex-
perience with 3.7% of teachers obtaining an advanced degree. The percentage steadily declines
across years of experience. The percentage of outcomes across experience for NBPTS are sim-
ilar to that of an advanced degree. The percentage of teachers obtaining NBPTS certification
peaks at five years of experience with 2.6% of teachers with that experience. This percentage
decreases steadily across years of experience, with a larger percentage of experienced teachers
obtaining NBPTS certification than those obtaining an advanced degree.
Figure 5.3 contains the mobility outcomes across years of experience for moving to a new
school within the same district, moving to a new school outside of the current district, and
attritting from the school system. Teachers within the first few years of teaching have a
high attrition rate. As shown, over 40% of teachers in their first year of teaching leave their
current school by either switching to a di↵erent school or attritting. The percentage of teachers
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attritting decreases significantly over the first several years of experience. This rate of attrition
is relatively constant over mid-career teachers, and then increases significantly as teachers
reach retirement age. Teachers switching schools more often move to a school within the same
district, compared to moving to a new district.
Figure 5.2: Credential Outcomes
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Figure 5.3: Mobility Outcomes
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Due to the nature of administrative data, the NCERDC data only provide a snapshot of
the North Carolina public school system over a set amount of time. The individuals observed
in the data have self-selected into the teaching profession, and specifically, into the North
Carolina public school system. I cannot observe prior labor force behavior, or the labor force
outcomes after an individual leaves the sample. For example, if an individual is in the data
one year and then absent the next year, I cannot determine if that individual chose to work in
education at a private school or in a di↵erent state, left the field of education, or left the labor
force altogether. Accordingly, this analysis does not attempt to explain teacher outcomes once
they leave North Carolina public schools. A similar problem involves individuals who leave
the sample and then reenter in a later year. I do not want to drop these observations once
the individual initially exits because I need to characterize the endogenous quality of teachers
within a school. Hence, I need to retain, in estimation, their observations after re-entry to the
North Carolina public school system. Due to the complications of modeling reentry, I treat
each spell of these individuals as a di↵erent individual.
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Table B.3 in the appendix summarizes the entry and attrition of the sample each year. In
1995, I initially observe 59,399 individuals. In subsequent years, the sample grows steadily,
with more individuals entering than leaving the sample. Overall, my sample contains 205,875
individuals providing 907,259 person-year observations. Table B.4 in the appendix provides
a summary of length of spell for individuals. Approximately 59.2 percent of individuals have
spells of three years or longer.
Table 5.1 compares the average school characteristics of the departing school and arrival
school for teachers that switch schools. The table shows, at a descriptive level, that teachers
tend to move to schools with fewer black students, fewer poor students, and more desirable
conditions. Looking at the mean for urban and rural geography, it appears that teachers also
tend to move to more suburban areas. The di↵erences between the means were found to be
statistically di↵erent from zero at the 1 percent level using paired t-tests.
Table 5.1: Selected School Characteristics of Switching Teachers
Departing School Arrival School
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Mean Std.
Dev.
Pct. Black 35.53 24.38 31.20 22.92
Pct. Lunch 36.08 20.93 29.74 20.92
Urban 0.32 0.46 0.29 0.45
Rural 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39
WCS: School is safe 2.15 1.17 2.42 1.14
WCS: Teachers respected 2.13 1.15 2.38 1.11
WCS:Teachers shielded from disruptions 2.14 1.17 2.37 1.13
Professional development 2.23 1.16 2.37 1.09
Reasonable class load 2.24 1.16 2.31 1.09
Low interfering duties 2.19 1.17 2.37 1.11
High standards for teachers 2.15 1.15 2.36 1.11
Teachers involved w/decisions 2.03 1.19 2.12 1.19
All di↵erences between means are found to be significant at the 1% level using paired t-tests.
Descriptions of Working Conditions Survey (WCS) variables are in Table A.1 of the appendix.
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5.3 Subsample of Teachers
The third empirical approach of this dissertation uses a subsample of teachers and schools
in order to reduce the size of the set of alternatives. The subsample includes high school
teachers in the central Piedmont region of North Carolina. North Carolina’s Piedmont region is
generally considered to be the 35 counties in the region between the foothills of the Appalachian
Mountains and the coastal plain.3 The subsample includes 14 counties within the central area
of the Piedmont region, excluding counties on the border of either Virginia or South Carolina.
In choosing a subsample of schools, border counties are excluded considering teachers near
state borders may more frequently appear to have attritted from the data, when in actuality
they are moving to a school in another state. The sample from this region includes 11,519
teachers from schools in Alamance, Chatham, Davidson, Davie, Durham, Forsyth, Guilford,
Lee, Montgomery, Moore, Orange, Randolph, Wake, and Yadkin counties. A total of 18
school districts are within this sample of counties, including 70 high schools. Several large
school districts are included in this sample from metropolitan areas such as Durham, Raleigh,
Greensboro, and Winston-Salem, as well as their more rural surroundings.
3North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State, 2012.
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6 Results
6.1 District Level Model Results
Estimates of the parameters for the credential and mobility equations are presented in Table
C.1 and Table C.2 of the appendix. These equations are estimated jointly using a discrete
factor random e↵ects method allowing the equations to be correlated across both the indi-
vidual permanent (µ) and time-varying (⌫t) unobserved components. The distributions for
the individual permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity components are approx-
imated using five and three mass points, respectively. The optimal number of mass points
was determined by adding additional mass points until the log-likelihood failed to improve as
determined using a likelihood ratio test. The probability weights and mass point are presented
in Table C.3 of the appendix.
Table 6.1 allows for evaluation of the accuracy of the model by comparing the predicted
outcomes of the model with the outcome means from the data. The first column in Table 6.1
contains the proportions found in the data for each outcome in the model, while the second
column contains the predicted outcome from the jointly estimated equations. The predicted
outcomes from the model are determined using the estimated coe cients from the model, in
addition to integrating over the unobserved heterogeneity components and a random draw
representing the idiosyncratic error component. As shown in the table, the model does well in
predicting the credential and employment outcomes, on average.
6.1.1 Marginal E↵ects
Using the coe cients from the jointly estimated equations, I calculate the marginal e↵ects
for changes in three variables: percent of students on free or reduced lunch, percent of black
students, and teacher salary. These marginal e↵ects are determined by first simulating the
Table 6.1: District Level Model Fit: Predicted Outcomes versus Observed Outcomes
Actual Predicted
Adv. degree 0.016 0.015
NBPTS 0.014 0.014
Stay at current school 0.927 0.935
Switch within district 0.045 0.039
Switch outside district 0.027 0.026
Attrit 0.153 0.176
baseline outcome and then subtracting this outcome from the simulated outcomes from the
change in the specified variable. Both outcomes are simulated by integrating over the individual
permanent and time-varying heterogeneity components, as well as an idiosyncratic error draw.
These di↵erences are then averaged across teachers based on the credentials of experience,
advanced degree, and NBPTS certification. All marginal e↵ects are one-period e↵ects averaged
over these groups of teachers. Standard errors for these marginal e↵ects are semi-parametrically
bootstrapped using 100 replications. Table 6.2 provides the baseline simulated probabilities
from which the marginal e↵ects are calculated. At baseline, teachers with fewer years of
experience have a higher probability of switching to a di↵erent school or attritting, relative to
teachers with more experience. Specifically, teachers within their first three years of teaching
are almost seven percentage points more likely to leave the public school system, compared
to all teachers. Teachers with more experience generally have a higher probability of staying
at their current school. Teachers holding an advanced degree, although having a similar
probability of staying at their current school, have a higher probability of attritting compared
to all teachers. Teachers who are NBPTS certified have a higher probability of staying at their
current school, and lower probability of attritting than the average teacher. This di↵erence
may represent NBPTS teachers being more invested in teaching than the average teacher and
teachers with advanced degrees.
Table 6.3 displays the marginal e↵ects of a 25 percentage point increase in the proportion
of students eligible for free or reduced lunch within a school. All figures in the table are
changes in percentage points from the baseline values in Table 6.2. Based on these results, this
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Table 6.2: Baseline Probabilities
Probability
Teacher Characteristics Stay Switch within
District
Switch outside
of District
Attrit
Years of experience:
0 to 2 68.10 4.60 4.70 24.62
3 to 5 72.11 4.42 3.68 20.00
6 to 10 76.86 4.22 2.80 16.26
11 plus 80.96 3.21 1.52 14.91
Advanced degree 76.86 3.63 2.15 19.30
NBPTS 80.58 2.74 1.47 15.35
All teachers 76.95 3.77 2.56 17.63
increase decreases the probability a teacher will stay at her current school for all teacher groups
evaluated, with the exception of teachers with fiver or fewer years of experience. This e↵ect is
largest for teachers with eleven or more years of experience, with a decrease in the probability
of staying by 1.47 percentage points. Given a teacher stays within the public school system,
the results show that the increase in eligible students for free lunch has a positive e↵ect on
both the probability of moving within the same district or moving to a new district.
Table 6.4 presents the marginal e↵ects of a 25 percentage point (approximately one stan-
dard deviation) increase in the proportion of black students at the current school. Across all
defined teacher groups, there is a decrease in the probability a teacher stays at her current
school. This decrease is the largest for teachers with fewer years of experience with approxi-
mately a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of staying. In addition, inexperienced
teachers switching schools tend to move to a new school district, as opposed to switching within
the same district. These results suggest that, in addition to specific schools having trouble
keeping teachers, the public school system in general faces di culties in retaining these teach-
ers.
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Table 6.3: Marginal E↵ects of Increased Students on Free/Reduced Lunch
Percentage Point Change in Probability
Teacher Characteristics Stay Switch
within
District
Switch
outside of
District
Attrit
Years of experience:
0 to 2 0.54 *** 0.62 *** 0.34 *** -1.51 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
3 to 5 0.15 *** 0.64 *** 0.31 *** -1.11 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
6 to 10 -0.40 *** 0.59 *** 0.20 *** -0.39 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
11 plus -1.47 *** 0.38 *** 0.59 *** 0.49 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Advanced degree -1.03 *** 0.48 *** 0.13 *** 0.42 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
NBPTS -0.96 *** 0.37 *** 0.09 *** 0.53 ***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
All teachers -0.97 *** 0.47 *** 0.15 *** 0.36 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications.
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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Table 6.4: Marginal E↵ects of Increased Black Students
Percentage Point Change in Probability
Teacher Characteristics Stay Switch
within
District
Switch
outside of
District
Attrit
Years of experience:
0 to 2 -2.77 *** -0.25 *** 0.41 *** 2.59 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
3 to 5 -2.78 *** -0.27 *** 0.39 *** 2.64 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
6 to 10 -2.38 *** -0.18 *** 0.24 *** 2.30 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
11 plus -1.44 *** 0.44 *** 0.09 *** 0.88 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Advanced degree -2.29 *** -0.13 *** 0.19 *** 2.23 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
NBPTS -0.80 *** -0.14 *** 0.20 *** 0.77 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
All teachers -2.19 *** -0.15 *** 0.23 *** 2.12 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications.
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
The marginal e↵ects of a $5,000 increase in teacher salary (approximately 15% of the mean
salary observed in the sample) are provided in Table 6.5. Table 6.5 shows that, averaged over
all teachers, the increase in salary has a small positive increase on the probability of a teacher
staying at her current school. This e↵ect is largest for inexperienced teachers with a $5,000
increase in salary associated with an increase in the probability of staying of approximately
1.58 percentage points. While this increase in salary has the same e↵ect on the probability of
staying at the current school for NBPTS teachers as it does all teachers, this e↵ect is almost
twice as large for teachers with an advanced degree. The increase in salary is associated with
a decrease in the attrition probability averaged over all teachers. However, there is a positive
and significant e↵ect of this increase of salary on the attrition of teachers with three to ten
years of experience. This result is puzzling due to its inconsistency with traditional labor
supply theory. Considering that it is di cult to imagine a scenario where individuals dislike
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a higher salary, other causes, including the demand side assumptions discussed earlier, are
plausible. Further discussion of potential biases are included in Chapter 7.
Table 6.5: Marginal E↵ects of Increased Salary
Percentage Point Change in Probability
Teacher Characteristics Stay Switch
within
District
Switch
outside of
District
Attrit
Years of experience:
0 to 2 1.58 *** -0.13 ** -0.28 *** -1.20 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
3 to 5 0.36 *** -0.19 *** -0.26 *** 0.09 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
6 to 10 -0.16 *** -0.08 -0.20 *** 0.44 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
11 plus 0.27 *** 0.06 *** -0.11 *** -0.23 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Advanced degree 0.61 *** -0.00 *** -0.13 *** -0.47 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
NBPTS 0.33 *** -0.01 *** -0.08 *** -0.23 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
All teachers 0.34 *** -0.01 -0.15 *** -0.18 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Standard errors are bootstrapped using 100 replications.
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Figures 6.1 through 6.6 present the marginal e↵ects across the full range of teaching expe-
rience. Figure 6.1 shows the relatively constant e↵ect across experience level of the increase
in free lunch students on switching schools. This change in student composition has a much
larger, and varying, e↵ect on attrition across experience levels. This increase decreases the
probability of attrition for teaching with less than ten years of experience. Figures 6.4 through
6.6 compare the marginal e↵ects of the select school characteristics on attrition across teachers
with di↵erent credentials. The change in percentage of free lunch students generally has a sim-
ilar e↵ect on attrition for teachers with NBPTS certification or a master’s degree as it does to
all teachers. As shown in Figure 6.5, the e↵ect of a change in the percentage of black students
has a much lower e↵ect on attrition for NBPTS certified teachers than teachers with a master’s
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degree and teachers without these certifications. The e↵ect of the $5,000 increase in salary
has a similar pattern across experience for teachers with di↵erent credentials, however, this
change in salary has a larger decrease in attrition for NBPTS and master’s degree teachers.
Figure 6.1: E↵ect of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch on Mobility
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Figure 6.2: E↵ect of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black on Mobility
-1
0
1
2
3
Ch
an
ge
 in
 M
ob
ilit
y
(P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
Po
int
s)
0 10 20 30
Experience (Years)
Within District Outside District Attrit
43
Figure 6.3: E↵ect of $5,000 Increase in Salary on Mobility
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Figure 6.4: E↵ect of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch on Attrition
Comparison Across Teacher Groups
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Figure 6.5: E↵ect of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black on Attrition
Comparison Across Teacher Groups
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Figure 6.6: E↵ect of $5,000 Increase in Salary on Attrition
Comparison Across Teacher Groups
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6.1.2 Long Run E↵ects
One of the features of this study is the modeling of the mobility and credential outcomes
dynamically. This attribute allows for the ability to capture long run marginal e↵ects. While
the short-run, within-period, e↵ects may appear small, the e↵ects of some characteristics may
be greater in the long run. When informing policy, it is useful to consider potential e↵ects
beyond the current period.
Given the high rates of attrition of inexperienced teachers, policy makers and school ad-
ministrators may be interested in the long run e↵ects of school characteristics on the size of
a teacher cohort. For example, they may consider providing new or inexperienced teachers
an environment that limits stress and is conducive for professional development. This im-
proved environment may come through programs to alleviate the school characteristics that
are correlated with teacher attrition, or even programs to place new teachers in schools with
established environments. Once a teacher accumulates teaching experience, she may be more
apt to handle the challenges of teaching and remain in the public school system longer.
In order to evaluate the potential e↵ects of these policies on inexperienced teachers, I use
the dynamic model to simulate teacher attrition outcomes. For this simulation, I start with
teachers with zero years of teaching experience in 1995 (approximately 4,000 teachers). In order
to provide teachers with an improved environment, I change the school characteristics of these
teachers to be in the top decile of the characteristics shown to be “preferred” by teachers. These
characteristics include percent of students eligible for free or reduced lunch, percent of black
students, and the working conditions characterizing factors such as school safety, professional
development opportunities, and administrative support. The credential outcomes, as well
as the attrition outcomes, are simulated forward across periods, while integrating over the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
Figure 6.7 contains the results of this policy simulation. The results of the baseline char-
acteristics represents the simulated attrition of teachers at schools with characteristics as ob-
served in the data. The results of the “preferred” characteristics represents the simulated
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attrition of these teachers if they were placed in environments with the preferred character-
istics as described above. The simulated results show the percentage of these inexperienced
teachers remaining in the public school system in the years following. The di↵erence between
these two lines represents the additional percent of teachers remaining in the public school sys-
tem due to the changes in preferred characteristics. For example, after one year of teaching,
an additional four percent of the new teachers remain in public schools. This di↵erence peaks
at four years of experience, with approximately an additional seven percent of new teachers
still in the public school system. After the fourth year of teaching, the e↵ects of the policy
diminish, and, at approximately ten years of experience, there is no distinguishable di↵erence
in the percent of these teachers remaining in public schools.
Figure 6.7: Policy Simulation, Providing New Teachers with “Preferred” School Characteristics
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6.2 School Level Model Results
6.2.1 Random Sampling of Alternatives
The second empirical approach of this dissertation, outlined in Chapter 4, uses a random
sample of alternatives in the choice set of each teacher. As described earlier, this equation is not
jointly estimated with the credential or attrition equations. This model includes 20 randomly
sampled alternatives from the universe of schools in the sample. Estimated coe cients for this
single equation conditional logit model with random sampling of alternatives are displayed in
table C.7 of the appendix.
Based on these coe cients, the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced lunch at
a school has a negative and significant e↵ect on the probability a teacher chooses that school.
This negative e↵ect increases in magnitude for male teachers, as well as those with a master’s
degree or NBPTS certification. The coe cient on percent of black students is negative, but
statistically insignificant. However, the interactions of this variable with indicators for a male
teacher, black teacher, experience, and master’s degree are all significant. Male teachers,
black teachers, and teachers with a master’s degree are more likely to select a school with a
higher percentage of black students. The interactions between each credential stock and the
percentage of teachers at a school with those credentials are both positive and significant. This
may indicate that teachers are drawn to schools with similar teachers in terms of credentials,
or that certain schools systematically hire teachers with these credentials.
Given the number of interaction variables and the nonlinear nature of a condition logit
model, the marginal e↵ects of changes in school characteristics are determined through simu-
lation, and averaged over the sample. Figures 6.8 through 6.13 include plots of the marginal
e↵ects of three school characteristics: percentage of students eligible for free or reduced lunch,
percentage of black students, and average teacher salary at the school. Of these figures, the
first three represent changes in these characteristics for the school at which a teacher currently
teaches. These represent the “push” e↵ects of current school characteristics when a teacher
evaluates switching schools. The last three represent changes in these characteristics for all
schools in the set of alternatives, with the exception of the current school. These changes in
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other school characteristics represent the “pull” aspect of possible alternatives when a teacher
is considering leaving her current school. Each of these marginal e↵ects and their 95% confi-
dence intervals are simulated using 100 bootstrap replications using the estimated coe cients
and covariance matrix.
Figure 6.8 displays the marginal e↵ect on switching school of a 25 percentage point in-
crease in students eligible for free or reduced lunch. This e↵ect is positive and statistically
significant. The change in the probability of leaving the current school is greater than 1.5% for
inexperienced teachers. This change remains positive, but steadily declines across experience.
Figure 6.9 displays the marginal e↵ect of a 25 percentage point increase in black students
on switching schools. The change in student demographics has the largest e↵ect for teachers
with less than five years of experience. This e↵ect is not statistically di↵erent from zero for
teachers with experience between five and 20 years.
The marginal e↵ects across experience of a $5,000 increase in salary on the probability of
switching school are shown Figure 6.10. This increase in salary decreases the probability of a
teacher switching schools, with the largest e↵ect on inexperience teachers. This statistically
significant e↵ect diminishes over the range of experience.
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Figure 6.8: “Push E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch at Current School
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Figure 6.9: “Push E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black at Current School
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Figure 6.10: “Push E↵ect” of $5,000 Increase in Salary at Current School
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Figures 6.11 through 6.13 show the marginal e↵ects of these changes in percent of free
lunch students, percent of black students, and average salary for all other schools excluding
the current school of the teacher. The trend across experience for these e↵ects generally mirror
those found in Figures 6.8 through 6.10, although there exist slight di↵erences in magnitude.
The e↵ect of the increase in percentage of free lunch students (Figure 6.11) is negative and
statistically significant across teachers of every experience level. This magnitude of this e↵ect
is greatest for first year teachers at -1.5%, and steadily become smaller as experience increases.
Figure 6.12 shows that an increase in the percentage of black students at other schools
increases the probability that a teacher leaves the current school. This e↵ect is statistically
significant, and larger across the range of experience when compared with the same change in
students at the current school.
Finally, Figure 6.13 displays the marginal e↵ect of a $5,000 increase in salary. This e↵ect
is positive and significant across the range of experience, with its largest magnitude at lower
levels of teaching experience.
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Figure 6.11: “Pull E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch at All Other Schools
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Figure 6.12: “Pull E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black at All Other Schools
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Figure 6.13: “Pull E↵ect” of $5,000 Increase in Salary at All Other Schools
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6.2.2 Subsample of Teachers
The empirical model in Section 4.6.2 includes the credential, attrition, and mobility equations
for a sample of high school teachers in the Piedmont region of North Carolina. These equations
are jointly estimated using the DFRE method described in Section 4.3. Tables C.9 through
C.11 display the coe cients for these equations. I use eight points of support for the individual
permanent heterogeneity and four points of support for individual time-varying heterogeneity.
The marginal e↵ects of these mass points are allowed to vary across equation, as well as
across outcomes within discrete equations. This attribute results in unique e↵ects across mass
points for all 70 outcomes of the mobility equation. Table C.12 of the appendix displays
the coe cients for these points of support. Permanent and time-varying mass points were
added to the specification until the likelihood function failed to improve significantly, using a
likelihood ratio test. The likelihood failed to improve beyond eight permanent points and four
time-varying points.
I evaluate the fit of the model by comparing the predicted outcomes from the equations
with the actual outcomes observed in the data. These predicted outcomes are determined using
the estimated coe cients and integrating over the unobserved heterogeneity components to
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calculate the outcome probabilities. Along with a random draw, representing the idiosyncratic
error component, the outcome probabilities are used in calculating the predicted outcome. The
comparison of these predicted and actual outcomes, provided in Table C.8, show a relatively
accurate fit of the model.
The coe cients in Table C.11 show a positive, but insignificant e↵ect of percentage of black
students and percent of free lunch students on the school choice of teachers. The interaction
between percentage of black students and the indicator for black teacher is both positive and
significant. The interactions of both black students and free lunch students with each of the
credential stock variables are not found to be significantly di↵erent from zero.
Figures 6.14 through 6.19 display the simulated marginal e↵ects of select school charac-
teristics on the mobility of teachers. These marginal e↵ects are short-run results of changes
in school characteristics. These changes include increases in percent of students on free or
reduced lunch, percent of black students, and teacher salary. These marginal e↵ects are cal-
culated by taking the di↵erence between predicted outcomes before and after the specified
school characteristic is changed. The simulated outcomes use the coe cients from the jointly
estimated equations and integration over the unobserved heterogeneity components.
The first set of marginal e↵ect simulations, found in tables 6.14 to 6.16, represent the
results of changes in the current school characteristics of a teacher. The choice probabilities
produced by the conditional logit model of equation (4.13) are a function of the characteristics
of every alternative. The e↵ect on mobility of changing a characteristic of the current school
represents a “push” e↵ect of that characteristic.
The marginal e↵ects for a 25 percentage point increase in the number of students eligible
for free or reduced lunch at the teacher’s current school are presented in figure 6.14. Although
statistically significant, the e↵ect of this increase on the probability of a teaching leaving her
school for another school is small and positive. This increase in probability of switching schools
is relatively constant across years of experience. The magnitude of this demographic change is
larger for attrition, and steadily increases across years of experience. This e↵ect on attrition
changes sign from a negative e↵ect for teachers with less than 15 years of experience to a
positive e↵ect for more experienced teachers.
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Figure 6.15 displays the marginal e↵ects for a 25 percentage point increase in the number
of black students at the teacher’s current school. This change in student composition has a
negative, statistically significant e↵ect for teachers in their first few years of teaching. The
e↵ect becomes insignificant for teachers between four and twenty years of experience before
becoming negative for teachers later in their teaching careers. This change in demographics
has a positive e↵ect on teacher attrition. For more inexperienced teachers, increasing the
percent of black students is associated with up to a three percent increase in attrition.
Figure 6.16 presents the e↵ects of a $5,000 increase in average salary at the current school.
Surprisingly, an increase in average salary at the current school is associated with a positive
and statistically significant increase in the probability a teacher moves to another school. One
possible explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive result is that the average salary does
not accurately represent the potential salary a teacher would earn at a school. Another reason
could be the bias caused from ignoring the demand side restrictions mentioned previously. The
bias from these restrictions may be accentuated in this subsample of teacher due to the regional
constraint of the sample. The assumptions regarding demand restrictions and the subsequent
potential bias are discussed further in the next chapter. The e↵ect of this increase in salary
on attrition is more intuitive. The increase in salary decreases the probability a teacher leaves
the school system. This e↵ect is larger for teachers at the beginning and end of their teaching
careers than it is for teachers in the middle range of teaching experience.
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Figure 6.14: “Push E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch at Current School
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Figure 6.15: “Push E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black at Current School
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Figure 6.16: “Push E↵ect” of $5,000 Increase in Salary at Current School
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The second set of marginal e↵ects, displayed in figures 6.17 through 6.19, represents the
results of characteristics at schools other than the one at which a teacher works. These “pull”
e↵ects capture the draw of characteristics of other schools. The marginal e↵ects are calculated
by increasing the selected characteristic at every alternative except the current school of the
teacher.
Figure 6.17 displays the e↵ect of a 25 percentage point decrease in the number of students
on free or reduced lunch. For teachers in their first two years of teaching, this e↵ect is positive
and statistically significant. Beyond three years of experience, the e↵ect is positive, but not
statistically significant for teachers with less than 27 years of experience.
The marginal e↵ects in figure 6.18 represent the e↵ect of a 25 percentage point decrease
in the number of black students on the probability a teacher leaves her school for another.
The results show a negative e↵ect on the probability a teacher switches schools. This e↵ect
is statistically insignificant, with the exception of teachers with fewer than three years of
experience or greater than 22 years of experience.
Figure 6.19 presents the marginal e↵ect of a $5000 decrease in average salary at all other
alternatives on the probability a teacher switches schools. Similar to the e↵ects of figure
6.16, the results of this e↵ect have an unexpected positive sign. These e↵ects are statistically
significant over the range of experience. This change in demographics has the largest e↵ect for
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inexperienced teachers at 1.7% increase in the probability of switching schools.
Figure 6.17: “Pull E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch at All Other Schools
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Figure 6.18: “Pull E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black at All Other Schools
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Figure 6.19: “Pull E↵ect” of $5,000 Increase in Salary at All Other Schools
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I also use the subsample of high school teachers to estimate equations for attrition and
mobility without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Tables C.13 and C.14 of the ap-
pendix present the results of this estimation. Figures C.4 through C.9 of the appendix show
the marginal e↵ects of school characteristics on the mobility probabilities. Comparing these
results with the results from the model with unobserved heterogeneity (Figures 6.14 through
6.19 described above) there are a few interesting di↵erences. Most notably, as shown in Figure
C.6, the e↵ects of an increase in salary at the current school on the probability that a teacher
switches schools are negative and significant across all experience levels. When jointly esti-
mated with the other equations, these marginal e↵ects of increased salary on the probability of
switching become positive (Figure 6.16). This change in sign between the e↵ects predicted by
two specifications also occurs when comparing the e↵ects of changes in salary at other schools
(Figures 6.19 and C.9), although this e↵ect is insignificant for most levels of experience when
jointly estimated.
6.3 Comparison of Models with and without Non-pecuniary Characteristics
The majority of previous studies use student demographics, particularly the percent of students
eligible for free or reduced lunch and the percent of black students, as the main representatives
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of the non-pecuniary characteristics of teaching at a school. These student characteristics
could be correlated with other non-pecuniary attributes that are important to teachers, yet
unobservable to the researcher. For example, consider the possibility of there existing a neg-
ative correlation between these non-pecuniary characteristics and both student demographics
and the probability a teacher leaves the current school. Excluding these non-pecuniary char-
acteristics could result in overestimating the e↵ect of certain student demographics on teacher
mobility probabilities.
In order to have a clearer understanding of the influence of these non-pecuniary benefits, I
estimate the district-level model from section 4.2 without the non-pecuniary characteristics de-
scribed by the working condition surveys for a random sample of 25,000 teachers. The excluded
variables are: school safety, respect of teachers, if teachers are shielded from disruptions, pro-
fessional development opportunities, class load, amount of interfering duties, and if teachers are
involved in decision-making. I then compare the simulated marginal e↵ects of changes in the
percent of free lunch students and percent of black students with the marginal e↵ects simulated
from estimates that include the non-pecuniary characteristics. I use a likelihood ratio test to
determine whether there is a significant di↵erence between the restricted model (without the
non-pecuniary characteristics) and the unrestricted model (with the non-pecuniary benefits).
The likelihood test statistic was significant at the 0.001% level, consequently rejecting the null
hypothesis that the maxima of the restricted and unrestricted log-likelihood functions are the
same.
The results of these simulated marginal e↵ects over the range of experience are displayed
in Figures 6.20 to 6.25. These figures allow a visual comparison of the two models, with
and without the non-pecuniary benefits. The 95% confidence intervals of these e↵ects are
determined through bootstrapping using 100 draws from the covariance matrix of each model.
Figures 6.20 through 6.22 show the marginal e↵ects of the models for a 25 percentage point
increase in the percent of student eligible for free or reduced lunch on the probability a teacher
switches to a di↵erent school within the same district, switches to a di↵erent school in a di↵er-
ent district, and attrits for the public school system, respectively. Regarding these marginal
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e↵ects on switching within the same district (Figure 6.20), excluding the non-pecuniary char-
acteristics produces larger changes in the mobility probability for teachers with 13 to 22 years
of experience. The overlapping confidence intervals of the estimates suggest that the di↵erence
in e↵ects are not significantly di↵erent.
Figure 6.21 displays the marginal e↵ects on the probability of switching schools outside of
the district. For teachers with less than ten years of experience, including the non-pecuniary
characteristics increasing the marginal e↵ect of this student demographic group on mobility
outside the district. The magnitude of this di↵erence is largest for first year teachers at
approximately 0.7 percentage points. The di↵erences in e↵ects decrease as experience increases
and are insignificant for teachers beyond seven years of experience.
The marginal e↵ects on attrition for the two models are shown in Figure 6.22. The marginal
e↵ects from the model with the non-pecuniary characteristics are larger for teachers with
three or less years of experience. This di↵erence changes sign as experience increases, with
overlapping confidence intervals across most levels of experience.
Figure 6.20: Model Comparison: Marginal E↵ects of Increasing Pct. Lunch
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Figure 6.21: Model Comparison: Marginal E↵ects of Increasing Pct. Lunch
Switching Outside District
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Figure 6.22: Model Comparison: Marginal E↵ects of Increasing Pct. Lunch
Attrition
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Figures 6.23 through 6.25 show the marginal e↵ects of the two specifications for a 25
percentage point increase in the percent of black students. Figure 6.23 displays these e↵ects
for the probability of switching to a di↵erent school within the same district. The magnitude of
this di↵erence is largest for teachers with less than three years of experience, with a maximum
of approximately 0.8 percentage points. This di↵erence declines across experience but remains
greater than 0.5 percentage points for teachers with less than twenty years of experience.
Figure 6.24 displays the marginal e↵ects for the probability of switching to a di↵erent school
in a di↵erent district. The di↵erences between the marginal e↵ects of the two models are small.
Figure 6.25 displays the marginal e↵ects on the probability of attrition for the two models.
The magnitude of the di↵erence shows that the model without non-pecuniary characteristics
estimates the e↵ect of the percent of black students on attrition as consistently one percentage
point larger than the model with non-pecuniary characteristics across all levels of experience.
This di↵erence between the models is larger for teachers with ten or fewer years of experience,
with the largest di↵erence being approximately 1.5 percentage points.
The results of these comparisons between the two models show that including the non-
pecuniary characteristics does influence the estimated marginal e↵ects. This di↵erence is
perhaps most apparent for the e↵ect of the percent of black students on the probability of
teacher attrition. These results suggest that the exclusion of variables that better characterize
non-pecuniary aspects of a school may result in confounded estimates of the e↵ect of certain
student demographics.
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Figure 6.23: Model Comparison: Marginal E↵ects of Increasing Pct. Black
Switching Within District
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
Ch
an
ge
 in
 M
ob
ilit
y
(P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
Po
int
s)
0 10 20 30
Experience (Years)
With Non-pecuniary Characterisics
Without Non-pecuniary Characteristics
                             (with 95% confidence intervals)
Figure 6.24: Model Comparison: Marginal E↵ects of Increasing Pct. Black
Switching Outside District
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Figure 6.25: Model Comparison: Marginal E↵ects of Increasing Pct. Black
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7 Discussion
With teacher quality being both an important and expensive school resource, understanding
the employment outcome of teachers may have important policy implications. In this research,
I add to the current literature by estimating teacher mobility probabilities, along with several
endogenous teacher credential probabilities, using longitudinal data on North Carolina public
schools. I jointly estimate these equations using a discrete factor random e↵ects method that
reduces potential bias by controlling for individual permanent and time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity.
Results show that, on average, teacher mobility outcomes are more sensitive to changes
in student demographic makeup, relative to changes in salary. These results, although small
in magnitude, suggest that schools with a higher proportion of black students and students
eligible for free or reduced lunch will experience higher teacher turnover, and may have di culty
in retaining teachers with characteristics associated with teacher quality. These results also
suggest that substantial increases in salary may be needed in order to induce desirable teacher
movement outcomes. Given the working condition variables I use as control variables for non-
pecuniary benefits at a school, these estimates may be more accurate depictions of the true
e↵ects of student and salary changes. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity may also help
to isolate the true marginal e↵ects of these variables.
Although these one-period marginal e↵ects seem relatively small in magnitude, over time
the dynamic e↵ects of these changing school characteristics may have larger implications for the
composition of teachers within specific types of schools. I use a policy simulation characterizing
the e↵ects of providing teachers with “preferred” school environments to observe the e↵ects
on attrition. The results show that this policy may help to keep some teachers in the public
schools longer, but after approximately ten years, the percent of these teachers still remaining
is the same as without the policy.
This research also investigates the “pull” aspect of mobility, using two di↵erent empirical
specifications in which characteristics of potential employment options draw a teacher from
her current school. The first of these specifications uses the entire sample of teachers with
a randomly selected set of school alternatives. Results show the e↵ects of changes in school
characteristics on mobility probabilities are larger for inexperienced teachers. The second of
these specifications uses a subsample of high school teachers from the central Piedmont region.
These results are generally smaller in magnitude than the results of the previous models, and
statistically insignificant for several levels of teaching experience.
7.1 Limitations and Future Research
The composition of teacher quality within a school results from the complex behavior and
restrictions of both labor supply and labor demand forces. The administrative data available
provide only the outcome, specifically the match between teacher and school, of this compli-
cated process. Unfortunately, the nature of these administrative data results in the absence
of personal information about teachers. These specific data may be important in examining a
profession where the substantial e↵ect of family transitions on career decisions are supported
anecdotally as well as in the literature. Therefore, these administrative data, analyzed alone,
may invariably provide challenges in fully explaining teacher mobility with the school sys-
tem. Fully describing the teacher quality composition requires more detailed data, or more
complicated empirical techniques.
This research assumes there are no demand side restrictions in the hiring process. The
broad protection of teacher tenure laws suggests that most transitions of teachers are voluntary
moves. Also, during the sample period of these data, studies show the state of North Carolina
was a net importer of teachers. For these reasons, it is reasonable to assume that most
separations of teachers from their school are not a result of demand side decisions. Even though
most separations may be initiated by the supply side, certainly the demand side restrictions
are involved when teachers are hired at a particular school.
Demand side restrictions create several broad general equilibrium type issues. These issues
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involve the constraints individuals face concerning employment opportunities, particularly the
availability of positions. While assuming these problems do not exist is more palatable in
labor research using commonly used large national surveys, these assumptions have greater
potential for creating bias in my research, which examines the match between employee and
employer in a particular labor market.
One potential bias comes through the assumption that the set of school alternatives (S)
for each individual is exogenous. My model assumes that each school enters each teacher’s
alternative set with the same probability. Realistically, not every school is willing to hire every
type of teacher. Schools make hiring decisions based on both observable and unobservable (to
the researcher) characteristics of the teacher. If, in practical terms, a teacher cannot obtain a
job at a school with more preferred characteristics and instead is constrained to accept a job at
a school with less preferred characteristics, it will appear as though the teacher did not prefer
the characteristics as strongly as she actually did. In estimation, this constraint will manifest
itself in coe cients of those characteristics that are biased toward zero. This assumption could
mute the e↵ect of preferred school characteristics on mobility probabilities.
An additional cause of bias could come from the fact that teachers can only move to a
school that has an open position. Because teachers cannot leave unless a position opens,
limited open positions could make it appear as though they prefer the characteristics of their
current school more than they actually do. Furthermore, if most positions open due to a
teacher leaving, those same school characteristics will be associated with both a departing and
arriving teacher. Although, including teaching experience interacted with school characteristics
should help reduce the contribution that retiring teachers make to this issue. Similar to the
previous bias mentioned, this bias could potentially result in underestimated e↵ects of school
characteristics, with the coe cient on preferred characteristics being smaller than the true
coe cient.
Both of these biases could help to explain the relatively small, and sometimes counter-
intuitive, e↵ects of changes in school characteristics presented in the previous chapter. For
example, these biases could explain the unexpected results of a salary increase on mobility.
Particularly, in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.3 we see an increase in salary is associated with an
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increase in attrition rates for teachers of certain experience levels. Also, Figures 6.16 and 6.19
show that an increase in salary is associated with an increase in the probability that a teacher
will leave the current school. Given simple economic theory on the e↵ects of wage on labor
force behavior, it is di cult to find a consistent explanation for these observed results. Is
this result due to teachers disliking higher salaries, or are the complexities and constraints of
sorting within the school system biasing the estimates? It seems more plausible that the latter
could be the primary source, through biased coe cients, of these confounding results.
These biases may be reduced through improvements in data and estimation methods.
With the existing data, some pattern of hiring at schools could be inferred. For example,
comparisons of teachers hired at particular schools could be made using methods similar to
propensity score matching. Information on the unobserved constraints posed by the demand
side could be gained by comparing teachers that never choose a particular school with teachers
with similar observable characteristics that do choose a particular school.
Potentially, the largest gain in mitigation of these biases comes through acquiring additional
data on the demand side of the market. The current data, showing only the outcome of
the match between school and teacher, does not provide the details of the hiring process of
schools. As mentioned above, one of the greatest sources of bias involved with the existing
estimation is the assumption that each school enters the teacher’s set of alternatives with
equal probability. Practically, this is representing the notion that every teacher is able to
move to any school of her choosing. Supplementing the existing data with additional data that
provides further information on the hiring practices of schools could help to limit the bias. For
example, obtaining the resumes of individuals interviewed in specific schools or districts would
provide observable characteristics of those individuals considered for a position. Although these
resumes may not include unobservable measures of quality, such as qualitative evaluation of
the interview or sample classroom setting, they could provide observable characteristics such
as teaching experience, NBPTS certification, or attainment of an advanced degree. These
additional data could then be used in construction of the set of alternatives for each individual.
Specifically, the probability of a school entering the alternative set of an individual could be
a function of the observable characteristics of the teacher and school. Ben-Akiva and Lerman
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(1985) and Train (2003) refer to the unequal probability of selecting alternatives as importance
sampling. In general, importance sampling is used to increase e ciency in estimation, because
some alternatives appear less frequently in the data, and subsequently have a lower probability
of being selected. For example, Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) use importance
sampling to reduce the probability of infrequently available telephone calling plans in entering
the set of alternatives when estimating the demand for telephone service.
In order to better capture demand side constraints, the construction of the set of alterna-
tives could reflect the availability of each alternative to an individual, rather than just the low
frequency of an observed outcome in the data. Several studies in the literature incorporate
methods of constraining the set of alternatives. The following are examples from the literature
that use various methods to generate probabilistic sets of alternatives.
Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987) evaluate a discrete choice model with constrained choice sets
using Brazilian work mode choice data. In their framework, they estimate the probability that
an individual is constrained to a single alternative, or is free to choose from a set of alternatives.
They find that this model performed better than a model that did not place restrictions on
the set of alternatives.
In his study on a rmative action in university admissions, Arcidiacono (2005) limits the
set of alternatives for an individual when selecting a college. This set of alternatives represents
the colleges to which an individual is accepted. The probability of acceptance into a university
is estimated as a function of both university and applicant characteristics, using limited data
on the set of schools to which individuals applied and were accepted.
Palma, Picard, and Waddell (2007) develop a model to account for constraints on the avail-
ability of alternatives in situations where the supply of alternatives with specific characteristics
may not be able to meet demand. In these situations, individuals may not be able to obtain
the alternative with preferred characteristics, resulting in biased estimates. Palma et al. apply
their model with capacity constraints to the housing market in Paris, France.
Aaberge, Colombino, and Wennemo (2009) use simulations to evaluate the consequences
of sampling construction assumptions regarding the set of alternatives in labor supply discrete
choice models. They conclude that while the fit of the model is generally robust regarding
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these assumptions, the out-of-sample predictions may be adversely a↵ected. Because of this,
they recommend caution when using these types of models for policy simulations. Similarly,
Niu and Tienda (2008) show, using Texas data on college admissions, that model results from
constraining choice sets is very sensitive to the methods used to select these choice sets.
Several of the studies mentioned above employ methods which may be applicable to the
future direction of my research. These methods could help to reduce the bias from the general
equilibrium forces that a↵ect teacher sorting, and current estimation. The ultimate goal of
this research path is to better characterize the quality of teachers in a school to analyze the
e↵ect of this observable teacher quality on student achievement. This agenda could include
analyses at the school level by examining the e↵ect of the percentage of teachers with certain
credentials on average school achievement. Another possibility is analysis at the classroom
level, with classroom achievement for each teacher being jointly estimated along with the
teacher credential and mobility outcomes.
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A Variable Descriptions
Table A.1: Description of Variables
Variable Description
Teacher Characteristics
Male Teacher is male.
Black Teacher is black.
Asian Teacher is Asian.
Hispanic Teacher is Hispanic.
Other race Teacher is race other than black, Asian, Hispanic, or
white.
Elementary school Teaches at an elementary school.
Middle school Teaches at a middle school.
High school Teaches at a high school.
College: Private Undergraduate institution is a private college.
College: Research university Undergraduate institution is a research university.
College: Urban Undergraduate institution is located in urban area.
College: Rural Undergraduate institution is located in rural area.
College: Historically black Undergraduate institution is a historically black col-
lege.
College: Most competitive Barron’s Selectivity Index: most competitive insti-
tution.
College: Highly competitive Barron’s Selectivity Index: highly competitive insti-
tution.
College: Very competitive Barron’s Selectivity Index: very competitive institu-
tion.
College: In NC Undergraduate institution is located in North Car-
olina.
College: Border state Undergraduate institution located in SC, TN, VA, or
GA.
College: Other state Undergraduate institution not in NC, SC, TN, VA,
or GA.
College: Graduate program Undergraduate institution has graduate courses in
education.
Salary (1000’s) Teacher’s base salary from state salary records.
NBPTS certified Indicator variable for if a teacher is NBPTS certified.
Advanced degree Indicator variable for if a teacher has an advanced
degree.
Experience Years of teaching experience defined from payroll.
School & District Characteristics
Students per teacher Number of students per instructional sta↵.
Total students (100’s) Number of students in the school.
continuing on next page
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Table A.1 continuing from previous page
Variable Description
Pct. Black Percent of students who are black.
Pct. Lunch Percent of students eligible for free or reduced lunch.
Urban Location classified as urban.
Rural Location classified as rural.
Pct. teachers with NBPTS Percent of teachers at school with NBPTS certifica-
tion.
Pct. teachers with adv. degree Percent of teachers at school with an advanced de-
gree.
Pct. teachers 0 to 2 years experience Percent of teachers at school with zero to two years
of teaching experience.
Pct. teachers 3 to 10 years experience Percent of teachers at school with three to ten years
of teaching experience.
Local revenue pct Percent of total revenue that is provided by local
sources (local revenue).
Local revenue per student (1000’s) Local revenue per student.
Expenditures per student (1000’s) Total expenditures per student.
Avg. salary supplement (1000’s) Average teacher salary supplement within the dis-
trict.
Pct. of teachers w/supplement Percent of teachers receiving salary supplement.
School is safe Teacher working condition survey: School is safe.
Teachers are respected Teacher working condition survey: Teachers are
trusted and respected.
Teachers shielded from disruptions Teacher working condition survey: Leadership
shields teachers from disruptions.
Professional development Teacher working condition survey: Teachers have re-
sources for professional development.
Reasonable class load Teacher working condition survey: Teachers have
reasonable student/class loads.
Low interfering duties Teacher working condition survey: Teachers are pro-
tected from interfering duties.
High standards for teachers Teacher working condition survey: Teachers are held
to high standards.
Teachers involved w/decisions Teacher working condition survey: Teachers are in-
volved in school decisions.
Number of school openings Number of school openings within the district.
SC border School district borders South Carolina.
GA border School district borders Georgia.
TN border School district borders Tennessee.
VA border School district borders Virginia.
Community Characteristics & Exclusion Restrictions
Non-agriculture employment (1000’s) County nonagricultural employment level.
Median HH income County median household income.
continuing on next page
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Table A.1 continuing from previous page
Variable Description
County unemployment rate County unemployment rate.
Population per mile2 (100’s) County population density (individuals/sq. mile).
UG completions (1000’s) County undergraduate-level education graduates.
Grad completions (100’s) County graduate-level education graduates.
NBPTS salary di↵erential (1000’s) State monthly salary di↵erential for NBPTS certifi-
cation.
Master’s salary di↵erential (1000’s) State monthly salary schedule di↵erential for a mas-
ter’s degree.
Graduate tuition (1000’s) Average in-state graduate tuition.
Per-Period Dependent Variables
Degree decision Indicator for completing advanced degree in current
period.
NBPTS decision Indicator for becoming NBPTS certified in current
period.
Switch decision Multinomial indicator for staying at current school,
or leaving for a di↵erent school in same district, or
di↵erent school in di↵erent district.
Attrit Indicator for last period teacher is observed in data.
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B Summary Statistics
Table B.1: Summary Statistics: Teacher Characteristics
Initially Observed All Years
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Male 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Black 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35
Asian 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05
Hispanic 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09
Other race 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
College: Private 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45
College: Research university 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
College: Urban 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50
College: Rural 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45
College: Has grad courses 0.79 0.40 0.82 0.39
College: Historically black 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
College: Most competitive 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07
College: Highly competitive 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
College: Very competitive 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28
College: In NC 0.63 0.48 0.71 0.45
College: Graduate program 0.53 0.50 0.65 0.48
Elementary school 0.36 0.49 0.35 0.50
Middle school 0.33 0.48 0.34 0.49
High school 0.31 0.47 0.31 0.48
Salary (1000’s) 29.00 9.26 34.24 9.12
NBPTS certified 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.20
Advanced degree 0.25 0.44 0.28 0.46
Experience 8.19 9.35 12.65 9.68
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics: School and Community Characteristics
All Years
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Students per teacher 14.45 5.60
Total students (100’s) 6.33 3.47
Pct. Black 32.14 25.62
Pct. Lunch 36.28 24.01
Urban 0.25 0.44
Rural 0.27 0.44
School is safe 2.42 1.15
Teachers are respected 2.42 1.14
Teachers shielded from disruptions 2.42 1.15
Professional development 2.44 1.14
Reasonable class load 2.38 1.14
Low interfering duties 2.40 1.14
High standards for teachers 2.41 1.13
Teachers involved w/decisions 2.31 1.19
Local revenue pct 0.29 0.09
Local revenue per student (1000’s) 2.14 1.08
Expenditures per student (1000’s) 7.24 1.50
Number of school openings 1.05 1.98
Avg. salary supplement (1000’s) 2.19 3.21
Pct. of teachers w/supplement 0.95 0.21
SC border 0.21 0.41
GA border 0.02 0.12
TN border 0.04 0.20
VA border 0.08 0.26
NBPTS salary di↵erential (1000’s) 2.05 1.56
Master’s salary di↵erential (1000’s) 3.01 2.22
Graduate tuition (1000’s) 1.18 1.82
Non-agriculture employment (1000’s) 122.23 153.56
County unemployment rate 4.98 2.07
Population per mile2 (100’s) 4.01 3.84
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Table B.3: Sample Entry and Attrition
Persons
Year Entry Attrition Total
1995 59,399 8,911 59,399
1996 8,825 7,846 59,313
1997 11,672 8,559 63,139
1998 10,747 9,614 65,327
1999 10,972 9,783 66,685
2000 11,532 10,736 68,434
2001 12,060 10,660 69,758
2002 12,754 11,073 71,852
2003 12,408 11,362 73,187
2004 12,888 11,563 74,713
2005 13,531 12,647 76,681
2006 14,202 12,586 78,236
2007 14,885 13,761 80,535
Total 205,875 139,101 907,259
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Table B.4: Length in Sample
Persons Person-Years
Years Observed No. Col % Cum
%
No. Col % Cum
%
1 47,741 23.2 23.2 47,741 5.3 5.3
2 36,333 17.6 40.8 61,707 6.8 12.1
3 24,231 11.8 52.6 64,461 7.1 19.2
4 17,800 8.6 61.3 64,802 7.1 26.3
5 13,987 6.8 68.0 64,738 7.1 33.4
6 10,967 5.3 73.4 61,477 6.8 40.2
7 9,180 4.5 77.8 60,373 6.7 46.9
8 7,698 3.7 81.6 58,200 6.4 53.3
9 6,671 3.2 84.8 57,146 6.3 59.6
10 5,532 2.7 87.5 52,784 5.8 65.4
11 5,058 2.5 90.0 53,380 5.9 71.3
12 4,366 2.1 92.1 50,088 5.5 76.8
13 3,591 1.7 93.8 45,002 5.0 81.8
14 12,720 6.2 100.0 165,360 18.2 100.0
Total 205,875 100.0 907,259 100.0
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C Model Results
C.1 District Level Model Results
Table C.1: District Level Estimation Results: Teacher Credential Outcomes
(jointly estimated with attrition and mobility equations)
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
Teacher Characteristics
Male -0.487 (0.398) -1.220 ** (0.543)
Black 0.317 (0.670) -1.348 *** (0.470)
Other race -0.063 (0.342) -0.271 (0.215)
NBPTS certified 0.450 (0.564) - -
Lagged NBPTS decision (t  1) -1.051 (0.753) - -
Advanced degree - - 0.656 (0.762)
Degree decision (t  1) - - 0.104 (0.282)
Lagged mobility decision (t  1) 0.053 (0.050) -0.483 *** (0.066)
Experience -0.054 (0.109) 0.122 (0.186)
Experience2 -0.891 (0.621) -1.500 ** (0.693)
Experience3 1.974 * (1.063) 2.592 *** (0.927)
Black ⇥ Experience -0.109 (0.136) 0.163 (0.112)
Black ⇥ Experience2 1.158 ** (0.576) -1.005 ** (0.478)
Black ⇥ Experience3 -2.732 *** (0.943) 1.866 ** (0.864)
Male ⇥ Experience 0.049 (0.076) 0.142 ** (0.071)
Male ⇥ Experience2 -0.315 (0.423) -1.023 ** (0.439)
Male ⇥ Experience3 0.527 (0.885) 2.057 ** (0.882)
NBPTS ⇥ Experience 0.151 (0.135) - -
NBPTS ⇥ Experience2 -1.391 * (0.777) - -
NBPTS ⇥ Experience3 3.889 *** (1.137) - -
Adv. degree ⇥ Experience - - 0.062 (0.039)
Adv. degree ⇥ Experience2 - - -0.163 (0.269)
Adv. degree ⇥ Experience3 - - 0.316 (0.618)
Salary (1000’s) 0.259 *** (0.020) 0.061 * (0.034)
Salary ⇥ Experience -0.008 * (0.005) -0.011 * (0.007)
Salary ⇥ Experience2 0.038 (0.027) 0.071 ** (0.028)
Salary ⇥ Experience3 -0.072 * (0.040) -0.137 *** (0.033)
College: Private -0.106 (0.075) -0.120 ** (0.051)
College: Research university 0.036 (0.437) 0.197 (0.334)
College: Urban 0.016 (0.180) 0.059 (0.049)
College: Rural 0.046 (0.119) -0.002 (0.062)
College: Graduate program 0.380 *** (0.048) 0.285 *** (0.031)
College: Historically black -0.133 (0.620) -0.296 (0.181)
College: Most competitive 0.242 (0.930) 0.613 (0.556)
College: Highly competitive 0.239 (0.757) 0.309 (0.841)
College: Very competitive 0.016 (0.309) 0.105 (0.286)
School Characteristics
continuing on next page
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Table C.1 continuing from previous page
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
Pct. Black -0.143 (0.538) 0.307 (0.817)
Male ⇥ Pct black 0.081 (0.529) -0.384 (0.819)
Black ⇥ Pct Black 0.346 (0.601) -0.253 (0.800)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience 0.039 (0.109) 0.025 (0.137)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 -0.949 (0.658) -0.399 (0.569)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 3.258 ** (1.398) 1.370 (0.925)
Pct. Lunch 0.251 (0.527) -0.235 (0.847)
Male ⇥ Pct lunch 0.199 (0.578) -0.031 (0.781)
Black Pct lunch -0.242 (0.615) 0.036 (0.775)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience 0.005 (0.123) 0.054 (0.148)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 0.133 (0.762) -0.464 (0.632)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 -0.574 (1.574) 0.640 (0.947)
Students per teacher 0.024 (0.036) -0.009 (0.056)
Total students (100’s) 0.005 (0.008) 0.011 * (0.006)
School is safe 0.058 *** (0.022) 0.019 (0.020)
Teachers are respected -0.007 (0.022) 0.015 (0.020)
Teachers shielded from disruptions -0.023 (0.043) 0.038 (0.056)
Professional development -0.022 (0.016) -0.006 (0.017)
Reasonable class load -0.033 (0.020) 0.038 ** (0.019)
Low interfering duties 0.020 (0.017) -0.003 (0.016)
High standards for teachers -0.036 (0.023) -0.074 *** (0.020)
Teachers involved w/decisions 0.042 ** (0.021) -0.014 (0.018)
Teachers shielded ⇥ Experience 0.006 (0.008) -0.002 (0.009)
Teachers shielded ⇥ Experience2 -0.033 (0.031) -0.008 (0.032)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree 6.285 *** (0.528) -0.910 (0.755)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS -0.987 *** (0.339) 12.752 *** (0.922)
Pct. teachers 0 to 2 years experience 1.277 ** (0.583) 1.261 (0.864)
Pct. teachers 3 to 10 years experience 1.241 *** (0.471) 0.030 (0.878)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience -0.008 (0.188) 0.007 (0.157)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience2 0.187 (0.758) 0.059 (0.751)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience 0.154 (0.200) 0.003 (0.163)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience2 -0.717 (0.745) -0.125 (0.746)
Middle school 0.004 (0.068) 0.046 (0.055)
High school -0.109 (0.124) 0.151 (0.098)
District & Community Characteristics
Urban -0.089 (0.055) 0.070 (0.054)
Rural 0.064 (0.054) 0.026 (0.044)
Local revenue pct -1.518 * (0.917) -0.040 (0.722)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) 0.044 (0.084) 0.004 (0.069)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) -0.067 (0.051) -0.014 (0.040)
Number of school openings -0.011 (0.009) 0.002 (0.016)
Avg. salary supplement (1000’s) -0.012 ** (0.006) 0.017 *** (0.006)
Pct. of teachers w/supplement -0.195 (0.422) 0.077 (0.563)
Non-agriculture employment (1000’s) -0.035 *** (0.009) 0.029 * (0.016)
Median HH income -0.007 (0.007) 0.000 (0.007)
County unemployment rate -0.020 (0.022) -0.026 (0.029)
Population per mile2 (100’s) 0.016 (0.020) -0.034 (0.025)
continuing on next page
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Table C.1 continuing from previous page
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
UG completions (1000’s) -0.053 (0.084) 0.124 (0.169)
Grad completions (100’s) 0.089 (0.119) -0.140 (0.261)
Colleges in county 0.032 ** (0.016) -0.004 (0.015)
Schools in county -0.071 (0.053) 0.009 (0.120)
Students in county (1000’s) 0.201 *** (0.070) -0.103 (0.190)
SC border -0.066 (0.075) 0.105 (0.085)
GA border 0.045 (0.429) -0.111 (0.686)
TN border -0.068 (0.546) -0.033 (0.588)
VA border 0.120 (0.238) -0.004 (0.071)
NBPTS salary di↵erential (1000’s) 0.020 *** (0.006) 0.115 *** (0.010)
Master’s salary di↵erential (1000’s) 0.049 *** (0.011) 0.030 (0.020)
Graduate tuition (1000’s) -0.001 (0.011) 0.012 (0.011)
Time trend -1.813 *** (0.116) 0.519 ** (0.246)
Time2/100 21.650 *** (1.004) -4.041 ** (2.003)
Time3/1000 -7.457 *** (0.520) 0.501 (1.074)
Constant 41.481 *** (0.708) 47.187 *** (0.943)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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C.1.1 Supplemental Figures
Figure C.1: E↵ects of Pct. Lunch, Pct. Black, and Salary on Attrition
(One Std. Dev. Increase)
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Figure C.2: E↵ects of Pct. Lunch, Pct. Black, and Salary on Within District Mobility
(One Std. Dev. Increase)
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Figure C.3: E↵ects of Pct. Lunch, Pct. Black, and Salary on Out of District Mobility
(One Std. Dev. Increase)
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Table C.5: District Level Estimation Results: Teacher Credential Outcomes
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
Teacher Characteristics
Male -0.514 *** (0.139) -1.126 *** (0.227)
Black 0.155 (0.194) -1.258 *** (0.370)
Other race -0.073 (0.085) -0.234 ** (0.097)
NBPTS certified 1.000 *** (0.094) - (0.000)
Lagged NBPTS decision (t  1) -0.928 *** (0.107) - (0.000)
Advanced degree - (0.000) 0.379 * (0.201)
Degree decision (t  1) - (0.000) 0.523 *** (0.072)
Lagged mobility decision (t  1) 0.064 * (0.039) -0.488 *** (0.051)
Experience -0.002 (0.104) 0.069 (0.127)
Experience2 -1.222 ** (0.529) -1.104 ** (0.559)
Experience3 2.456 *** (0.848) 1.819 * (0.965)
Black ⇥ Experience -0.054 (0.046) 0.157 ** (0.079)
Black ⇥ Experience2 0.740 ** (0.353) -0.980 ** (0.450)
Black ⇥ Experience3 -1.970 ** (0.815) 1.819 ** (0.856)
Male ⇥ Experience 0.070 * (0.039) 0.128 *** (0.047)
Male ⇥ Experience2 -0.451 (0.341) -0.934 *** (0.319)
Male ⇥ Experience3 0.825 (0.818) 1.897 *** (0.637)
NBPTS ⇥ Experience 0.211 *** (0.032) - (0.000)
NBPTS ⇥ Experience2 -1.714 *** (0.377) - (0.000)
NBPTS ⇥ Experience3 4.479 *** (1.004) - (0.000)
Adv. degree ⇥ Experience - (0.000) 0.146 *** (0.025)
Adv. degree ⇥ Experience2 - (0.000) -0.765 *** (0.201)
Adv. degree ⇥ Experience3 - (0.000) 1.510 *** (0.463)
Salary (1000’s) 0.171 *** (0.014) 0.051 ** (0.024)
Salary ⇥ Experience -0.008 *** (0.003) -0.011 ** (0.005)
Salary ⇥ Experience2 0.055 *** (0.018) 0.069 *** (0.023)
Salary ⇥ Experience3 -0.113 *** (0.032) -0.133 *** (0.030)
College: Private -0.110 *** (0.027) -0.121 *** (0.027)
College: Research university 0.060 (0.051) 0.180 *** (0.043)
College: Urban -0.013 (0.033) 0.052 * (0.030)
College: Rural 0.022 (0.035) -0.002 (0.032)
College: Graduate program 0.109 *** (0.026) 0.262 *** (0.026)
College: Historically black -0.073 (0.048) -0.264 *** (0.069)
College: Most competitive 0.314 * (0.168) 0.589 ** (0.236)
College: Highly competitive 0.198 *** (0.074) 0.326 *** (0.069)
College: Very competitive 0.080 * (0.048) 0.100 ** (0.043)
School Characteristics
Pct. Black -0.699 ** (0.332) 0.150 (0.512)
Male ⇥ Pct black -0.024 (0.178) -0.424 (0.320)
Black ⇥ Pct Black 0.481 ** (0.190) -0.281 (0.337)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience 0.159 ** (0.078) 0.052 (0.097)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 -1.624 *** (0.555) -0.559 (0.588)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 4.348 *** (1.273) 1.635 (1.197)
Pct. Lunch 0.627 * (0.321) -0.010 (0.523)
continuing on next page
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Table C.5 continuing from previous page
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
Male ⇥ Pct lunch 0.173 (0.206) -0.076 (0.406)
Black Pct lunch -0.179 (0.191) -0.004 (0.346)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience -0.077 (0.079) 0.020 (0.107)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 0.492 (0.604) -0.282 (0.659)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 -1.011 (1.422) 0.320 (1.352)
Students per teacher 0.022 (0.022) -0.011 (0.034)
Total students (100’s) -0.001 (0.004) 0.010 ** (0.004)
School is safe 0.052 *** (0.015) 0.018 (0.014)
Teachers are respected -0.002 (0.017) 0.018 (0.018)
Teachers shielded from disruptions 0.002 (0.036) 0.039 (0.040)
Professional development -0.010 (0.014) -0.004 (0.013)
Reasonable class load -0.018 (0.014) 0.039 *** (0.013)
Low interfering duties 0.025 * (0.014) -0.003 (0.014)
High standards for teachers -0.040 ** (0.016) -0.073 *** (0.015)
Teachers involved w/decisions 0.024 * (0.014) -0.015 (0.016)
Teachers shielded ⇥ Experience -0.001 (0.007) -0.003 (0.006)
Teachers shielded ⇥ Experience2 -0.009 (0.026) -0.003 (0.020)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree 5.400 *** (0.163) -0.925 ** (0.362)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS -1.113 (0.944) 11.757 *** (0.180)
Pct. teachers 0 to 2 years experience 1.025 *** (0.226) 1.198 *** (0.317)
Pct. teachers 3 to 10 years experience 1.123 *** (0.136) 0.001 (0.265)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience 0.084 (0.108) 0.009 (0.085)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience2 -0.288 (0.560) 0.013 (0.374)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience 0.011 (0.107) 0.005 (0.084)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience2 -0.009 (0.555) -0.103 (0.365)
Middle school 0.027 (0.030) 0.053 * (0.032)
High school -0.058 (0.043) 0.162 *** (0.042)
District & Community Characteristics
Urban -0.054 (0.035) 0.065 * (0.039)
Rural 0.040 (0.033) 0.021 (0.034)
Local revenue pct -1.355 (0.938) -0.094 (0.969)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) 0.067 (0.082) 0.005 (0.084)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) -0.074 *** (0.026) -0.024 (0.025)
Number of school openings -0.007 (0.007) 0.004 (0.008)
Avg. salary supplement (1000’s) -0.013 ** (0.005) 0.016 *** (0.005)
Pct. of teachers w/supplement -0.234 (0.320) 0.069 (0.212)
Non-agriculture employment (1000’s) -0.021 *** (0.006) 0.031 *** (0.006)
Median HH income -0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
County unemployment rate 0.004 (0.009) -0.021 ** (0.008)
Population per mile2 (100’s) 0.020 (0.013) -0.037 *** (0.012)
UG completions (1000’s) -0.102 *** (0.036) 0.110 *** (0.034)
Grad completions (100’s) 0.156 *** (0.051) -0.115 ** (0.048)
Colleges in county 0.015 (0.011) -0.005 (0.010)
Schools in county -0.073 *** (0.027) -0.005 (0.027)
Students in county (1000’s) 0.152 *** (0.041) -0.088 ** (0.042)
SC border -0.090 ** (0.036) 0.102 *** (0.039)
GA border -0.062 (0.277) -0.075 (0.160)
continuing on next page
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Table C.5 continuing from previous page
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
TN border -0.010 (0.079) -0.014 (0.079)
VA border 0.102 ** (0.049) 0.018 (0.051)
NBPTS salary di↵erential (1000’s) 0.018 *** (0.002) 0.113 *** (0.005)
Master’s salary di↵erential (1000’s) 0.048 *** (0.004) 0.031 *** (0.005)
Graduate tuition (1000’s) -0.001 (0.008) 0.013 (0.008)
Time trend -1.410 *** (0.086) 0.658 *** (0.170)
Time2/100 16.504 *** (1.140) -5.666 ** (2.242)
Time3/1000 -5.677 *** (0.483) 1.136 (0.944)
Constant -6.889 *** (0.514) -11.715 *** (0.786)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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C.2 School Level Model Results
Table C.7: School Level Estimation Results: Teacher Mobility Outcomes
School Choice
Variable Coe cient S.E.
Pct. Black -0.064 (0.048)
Pct. Black ⇥ Male 0.735 *** (0.055)
Pct. Black ⇥ Black 2.411 *** (0.047)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience -0.096 *** (0.015)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 0.610 *** (0.114)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 -1.036 *** (0.242)
Pct. Black ⇥ NBPTS 0.283 (0.202)
Pct. Black ⇥ Adv. degree 0.137 *** (0.052)
Pct. Black ⇥ Competitive college 0.415 *** (0.062)
Pct. Lunch -0.350 *** (0.050)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Male -1.369 *** (0.060)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience -0.037 ** (0.016)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 0.091 (0.125)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 0.051 (0.266)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ NBPTS -0.360 * (0.217)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Adv. degree -0.133 ** (0.062)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Competitive college -0.762 *** (0.065)
School is safe 0.054 *** (0.004)
Teachers are respected 0.043 *** (0.005)
Teachers shielded from disruptions 0.007 (0.005)
Pct. Students with low English score 0.302 * (0.160)
Pct. low English ⇥ NBPTS -1.069 (0.885)
Pct. low English ⇥ Adv. degree 0.231 (0.266)
Pct. Students with low math score -0.357 ** (0.160)
Pct. low math ⇥ NBPTS 0.200 (0.884)
Pct. low math ⇥ Adv. degree -0.164 (0.267)
Urban -0.063 *** (0.010)
Rural -0.030 *** (0.010)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) 0.226 *** (0.007)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) -0.226 *** (0.007)
Indicator for current school 3.452 *** (0.007)
Distance from current school -0.019 *** (0.000)
Distance ⇥ Male 0.002 *** (0.000)
Distance ⇥ Experience -0.001 *** (0.000)
Avg. salary at School 0.078 *** (0.004)
Avg. salary ⇥ NBPTS -0.023 (0.021)
Avg. salary ⇥ Adv. degree 0.012 ** (0.006)
Total students (100’s) 0.048 *** (0.001)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree -0.421 *** (0.046)
Adv. degree ⇥ Pct. adv. degree 2.182 *** (0.090)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS -0.756 *** (0.073)
NBPTS ⇥ Pct. NBPTS 6.677 *** (0.382)
Pct. teachers 0 to 2 years experience 0.516 *** (0.046)
Pct. teachers 3 to 10 years experience 1.395 *** (0.043)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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C.3 School Level Model Results using Subsample of Teachers
Table C.8: Model Fit: Predicted Outcomes versus Observed Outcomes
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Credential Outcomes
Adv. Degree 14.0 10.6
NBPTS 15.3 15.6
Mobility Outcomes
Attrit 18.5 21.9
School Alternative
1 1.43 1.42 36 0.52 0.53
2 1.18 1.19 37 0.45 0.48
3 1.63 1.65 38 0.35 0.35
4 1.29 1.29 39 0.60 0.61
5 0.69 0.70 40 0.48 0.48
6 0.94 0.95 41 0.18 0.16
7 1.19 1.17 42 0.36 0.32
8 1.57 1.54 43 0.37 0.37
9 1.43 1.66 44 2.60 2.60
10 1.21 1.23 45 0.76 0.75
11 1.99 1.96 46 0.94 0.98
12 0.20 0.23 47 0.98 0.96
13 1.09 1.08 48 2.10 2.14
14 1.07 1.06 49 0.66 0.61
15 1.00 0.97 50 1.79 1.73
16 2.03 2.06 51 2.47 2.49
17 2.12 2.12 52 1.83 1.78
18 1.41 1.31 53 1.40 1.42
19 2.27 2.27 54 1.71 1.66
20 2.19 2.19 55 1.74 1.76
21 1.58 1.65 56 1.54 1.59
22 1.12 1.09 57 2.85 2.81
23 2.22 2.22 58 2.58 2.57
24 1.91 1.89 59 2.64 2.65
25 1.99 1.94 60 2.88 2.94
26 1.84 1.87 61 1.84 1.59
27 1.50 1.45 62 0.91 0.99
28 2.05 2.03 63 2.02 2.04
29 2.59 2.56 64 2.52 2.54
30 0.36 0.33 65 2.59 2.62
31 0.54 0.55 66 2.60 2.66
32 0.37 0.41 67 0.74 0.81
33 0.48 0.48 68 1.99 1.95
34 0.46 0.49 69 1.55 1.53
35 0.36 0.32 70 1.20 1.21
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Table C.9: School Level Subsample Estimation Results: Teacher Credential Outcomes
(jointly estimated with mobility and attrition equations)
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
Constant -47.736 *** (8.412) -16.433 *** (1.960)
Time trend -7.149 *** (1.287) 2.402 *** (0.835)
Time2/100 91.676 *** (17.879) -27.508 ** (11.325)
Time3/1000 -34.591 *** (7.382) 9.520 ** (4.797)
Male -1.676 (1.070) -0.201 (0.589)
Black 1.935 *** (0.627) -0.724 (0.479)
Other race -0.567 (0.940) -0.123 (0.492)
NBPTS certified -3.167 *** (1.081) - -
Lagged NBPTS decision (t  1) -1.142 (1.189) - -
Advanced degree - - 0.972 ** (0.403)
Degree decision (t  1) - - -0.495 (0.371)
Lagged mobility decision (t  1) -1.479 * (0.837) -0.793 * (0.475)
Experience -1.294 *** (0.418) 0.033 (0.163)
Experience2 10.099 ** (4.720) -0.938 (1.035)
Experience3 -36.226 ** (15.686) 1.402 (2.038)
Male ⇥ Experience 0.323 (0.400) 0.044 (0.129)
Male ⇥ Experience2 -2.435 (4.440) -0.879 (0.844)
Male ⇥ Experience3 -1.621 (14.304) 2.235 (1.643)
Salary (1000’s) 0.765 *** (0.100) -0.003 (0.017)
Missing experience -1.410 (1.042) -1.280 * (0.737)
College: Private -0.760 ** (0.350) -0.224 * (0.123)
College: Urban 0.402 (0.422) 0.142 (0.143)
College: Rural 0.178 (0.535) 0.116 (0.167)
College: Graduate program 0.204 (0.274) 0.378 *** (0.118)
College: Historically black 0.298 (0.567) -0.764 ** (0.357)
College: Competitive 0.746 ** (0.360) -0.045 (0.133)
Black ⇥ Pct Black -0.199 (1.390) 0.652 (1.053)
Male ⇥ Pct black 0.648 (1.121) -0.669 (0.781)
Black Pct lunch -4.247 (3.108) -1.123 (1.275)
Total students (100’s) -0.027 (0.047) 0.008 (0.018)
Pct. Black 0.403 (2.148) 3.367 (2.095)
Pct. Lunch -3.430 (4.504) 2.999 (2.944)
School is safe -0.359 * (0.196) 0.048 (0.081)
Teachers are respected -0.051 (0.193) 0.044 (0.085)
Teachers shielded from disruptions 0.195 (0.195) -0.105 (0.076)
Urban -0.477 (0.362) -0.066 (0.150)
Rural 0.654 (0.512) -0.026 (0.253)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) -0.467 * (0.243) -0.035 (0.121)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) -0.840 *** (0.249) -0.139 (0.110)
Median HH income -0.007 (0.035) 0.019 (0.016)
County unemployment rate -0.466 *** (0.153) -0.076 (0.068)
Population per mile2 (100’s) 0.232 ** (0.092) -0.050 (0.035)
NBPTS salary di↵erential (1000’s) 0.051 ** (0.020) 0.157 *** (0.033)
Master’s salary di↵erential (1000’s) 0.250 *** (0.030) 0.017 (0.013)
Graduate tuition (1000’s) -0.244 ** (0.097) 0.052 (0.044)
continuing on next page
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Table C.9 continuing from previous page
Advanced Degree NBPTS
Variable Coe cient S.E. Coe cient S.E.
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience 1.290 (1.573) -0.744 (0.725)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 -13.871 (16.502) 5.394 (5.012)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 63.781 (48.363) -10.495 (10.108)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience 0.006 (0.916) -0.761 (0.516)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 1.975 (9.842) 4.905 (3.520)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 -42.096 (27.658) -9.448 (7.031)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience -9.279 *** (2.208) 0.433 (0.690)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience2 37.726 *** (10.901) -1.940 (2.089)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience 4.395 *** (1.531) -0.533 (0.631)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience2 -16.644 ** (6.967) 2.096 (1.915)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree 7.152 *** (1.546) -0.796 (0.862)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS 3.261 (2.349) 14.949 *** (1.150)
Pct. Students with low math score -12.974 ** (6.180) 4.802 (4.321)
Pct. Students with low English score 37.326 *** (8.569) -1.373 (4.918)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
100
Table C.10: School Level Subsample Estimation Results: Teacher Attrition Outcome
(jointly estimated with credential and mobility equations)
Attrit
Variable Coe cient S.E.
Teacher Characteristics
Male -0.164 * (0.091)
Black 0.399 *** (0.116)
Other race -0.052 (0.130)
Advanced degree 0.319 *** (0.045)
NBPTS certified -0.900 *** (0.218)
Degree decision (t  1) 0.121 (0.149)
Lagged NBPTS decision (t  1) -0.523 ** (0.211)
Lagged mobility decision (t  1) 0.020 (0.126)
Experience -0.028 (0.028)
Experience2 -0.602 *** (0.200)
Experience3 2.403 *** (0.403)
Male ⇥ Experience -0.032 (0.025)
Male ⇥ Experience2 0.300 (0.191)
Male ⇥ Experience3 -0.580 (0.390)
Salary (1000’s) -0.015 *** (0.003)
College: Private 0.028 (0.039)
College: Urban -0.031 (0.046)
College: Rural -0.103 * (0.057)
College: Graduate program -0.237 *** (0.037)
College: Historically black -0.090 (0.082)
College: Competitive 0.048 (0.047)
School & Community Characteristics
Pct. Black 0.761 *** (0.281)
Male ⇥ Pct black -0.040 (0.179)
Black ⇥ Pct Black -0.569 ** (0.246)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience -0.063 (0.064)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 0.704 (0.442)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 -1.620 * (0.865)
Pct. Lunch -0.910 ** (0.400)
Black Pct lunch 0.068 (0.418)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience 0.058 (0.078)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 0.128 (0.504)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 -0.403 (1.003)
Total students (100’s) 0.001 (0.006)
School is safe -0.006 (0.027)
Teachers are respected -0.052 * (0.027)
Teachers shielded from disruptions -0.016 (0.026)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree 0.094 (0.267)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS -0.196 (0.481)
Pct. Students with low English score 2.393 *** (0.882)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience -0.314 ** (0.149)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience2 0.241 (0.481)
Pct. Students with low math score -0.027 (0.714)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience 0.209 (0.130)
continuing on next page
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Table C.10 continuing from previous page
Attrit
Variable Coe cient S.E.
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience2 -0.507 (0.417)
Urban 0.109 ** (0.051)
Rural -0.146 * (0.080)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) -0.011 (0.039)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) 0.124 *** (0.034)
Median HH income -0.014 *** (0.005)
County unemployment rate 0.084 *** (0.021)
Population per mile2 (100’s) 0.005 (0.010)
Time trend 0.793 *** (0.124)
Time2/100 -9.523 *** (1.807)
Time3/1000 3.414 *** (0.825)
Constant -3.156 *** (0.424)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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Table C.11: School Level Subsample Estimation Results: Teacher Mobility Outcomes
(jointly estimated with credential and attrition equations)
School Choice
Variable Coe cient S.E.
Pct. Black 0.544 (1.082)
Pct. Black ⇥ Male 0.392 (0.472)
Pct. Black ⇥ Black 4.387 *** (0.496)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience -0.301 * (0.164)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 2.199 * (1.295)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 -3.696 (2.794)
Pct. Black ⇥ NBPTS 0.485 (2.213)
Pct. Black ⇥ Adv. degree 0.813 (0.558)
Pct. Black ⇥ Competitive college 0.493 (0.555)
Pct. Lunch 0.411 (1.169)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Male 0.628 (0.905)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience -0.305 (0.354)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 1.626 (2.913)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 -3.500 (6.338)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ NBPTS -3.828 (3.685)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Adv. degree 0.257 (1.034)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Competitive college -2.422 ** (1.048)
School is safe 0.121 (0.086)
Teachers are respected 0.015 (0.074)
Teachers shielded from disruptions 0.093 (0.082)
Pct. Students with low English score 3.222 ** (1.351)
Pct. low English ⇥ NBPTS 9.150 (10.034)
Pct. low English ⇥ Adv. degree -5.190 *** (1.930)
Pct. Students with low math score -3.265 *** (1.037)
Pct. low math ⇥ NBPTS -2.297 (6.341)
Pct. low math ⇥ Adv. degree 1.644 (1.402)
Urban 0.025 (0.191)
Rural -0.150 (0.186)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) 0.060 (0.111)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) -0.091 (0.098)
Indicator for current school 8.425 *** (0.206)
Distance from current school -0.061 *** (0.005)
Distance ⇥ Male 0.016 *** (0.004)
Distance ⇥ Experience -0.003 *** (0.000)
Avg. salary at School -0.163 (0.274)
Avg. salary ⇥ NBPTS 0.355 (0.286)
Avg. salary ⇥ Adv. degree -0.001 (0.084)
Total students (100’s) 0.050 * (0.026)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree -0.450 (0.790)
Adv. degree ⇥ Pct. adv. degree 0.850 (0.939)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS 0.018 (1.215)
NBPTS ⇥ Pct. NBPTS 5.763 (6.317)
Pct. teachers 0 to 2 years experience 0.148 (0.786)
Pct. teachers 3 to 10 years experience -0.232 (0.771)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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C.4 School Level Model Results using Subsample of Teachers (without con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity)
Table C.13: School Level Subsample Estimation Results: Teacher Attrition Outcome
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
School Choice
Variable Coe cient S.E.
Teacher Characteristics
Male -0.165 ** (0.077)
Black 0.272 *** (0.099)
Other race -0.011 (0.113)
Advanced degree 0.272 *** (0.034)
NBPTS certified -1.062 *** (0.189)
Degree decision (t  1) 0.001 (0.139)
Lagged NBPTS decision (t  1) -0.735 *** (0.196)
Lagged mobility decision (t  1) 0.071 (0.115)
Experience -0.087 *** (0.023)
Experience2 -0.026 (0.157)
Experience3 0.937 *** (0.303)
Male ⇥ Experience -0.032 (0.021)
Male ⇥ Experience2 0.293 * (0.152)
Male ⇥ Experience3 -0.561 * (0.296)
Salary (1000’s) -0.013 *** (0.002)
College: Private 0.017 (0.032)
College: Urban -0.059 (0.039)
College: Rural -0.116 ** (0.047)
College: Graduate program -0.227 *** (0.030)
College: Historically black -0.069 (0.071)
College: Competitive 0.060 (0.039)
School & Community Characteristics
Pct. Black 0.482 * (0.249)
Male ⇥ Pct black -0.032 (0.154)
Black ⇥ Pct Black -0.247 (0.213)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience 0.023 (0.060)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 0.062 (0.408)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 -0.530 (0.768)
Pct. Lunch -0.717 ** (0.363)
Black Pct lunch 0.037 (0.369)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience 0.007 (0.091)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 0.637 (0.650)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 -1.714 (1.278)
Total students (100’s) -0.004 (0.005)
School is safe -0.013 (0.022)
Teachers are respected -0.059 ** (0.023)
Teachers shielded from disruptions 0.000 (0.022)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree 0.000 (0.229)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS -0.201 (0.422)
Pct. Students with low English score 1.933 ** (0.834)
continuing on next page
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Table C.13 continuing from previous page
School Choice
Variable Coe cient S.E.
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience -0.473 *** (0.133)
Pct. low English ⇥ Experience2 1.187 *** (0.414)
Pct. Students with low math score -0.229 (0.658)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience 0.204 * (0.117)
Pct. low math ⇥ Experience2 -0.468 (0.368)
Urban 0.100 ** (0.043)
Rural -0.136 * (0.070)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) -0.001 (0.037)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) 0.105 *** (0.031)
Median HH income -0.012 *** (0.004)
County unemployment rate 0.075 *** (0.021)
Population per mile2 (100’s) 0.006 (0.008)
Time trend 0.505 *** (0.169)
Time2/100 -6.603 ** (2.565)
Time3/1000 2.465 ** (1.169)
Constant -1.864 *** (0.467)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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Table C.14: School Level Subsample Estimation Results: Teacher Mobility Outcomes
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
School Choice
Variable Coe cient S.E.
Pct. Black -0.350 (0.494)
Pct. Black ⇥ Male 0.619 (0.382)
Pct. Black ⇥ Black 3.196 *** (0.378)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience -0.296 ** (0.140)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience2 2.218 * (1.146)
Pct. Black ⇥ Experience3 -4.069 (2.502)
Pct. Black ⇥ NBPTS 0.764 (1.801)
Pct. Black ⇥ Adv. degree 0.566 (0.467)
Pct. Black ⇥ Competitive college 0.480 (0.463)
Pct. Lunch -0.005 (0.851)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Male -0.208 (0.711)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience -0.035 (0.252)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience2 -0.002 (2.065)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Experience3 -0.239 (4.486)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ NBPTS -3.185 (2.649)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Adv. degree 0.069 (0.839)
Pct. Lunch ⇥ Competitive college -1.563 * (0.877)
School is safe 0.070 * (0.041)
Teachers are respected 0.014 (0.044)
Teachers shielded from disruptions 0.008 (0.041)
Pct. Students with low English score 1.606 (1.190)
Pct. low English ⇥ NBPTS 7.181 (5.268)
Pct. low English ⇥ Adv. degree -2.452 (2.101)
Pct. Students with low math score -2.714 *** (0.850)
Pct. low math ⇥ NBPTS -2.283 (5.400)
Pct. low math ⇥ Adv. degree 0.265 (1.382)
Urban -0.145 ** (0.072)
Rural -0.191 (0.127)
Local revenue per student (1000’s) 0.094 (0.068)
Expenditures per student (1000’s) -0.047 (0.061)
Indicator for current school 6.009 *** (0.063)
Distance from current school -0.046 *** (0.003)
Distance ⇥ Male 0.012 *** (0.003)
Distance ⇥ Experience -0.002 *** (0.000)
Avg. salary at School 0.081 * (0.046)
Avg. salary ⇥ NBPTS 0.424 * (0.236)
Avg. salary ⇥ Adv. degree 0.031 (0.063)
Total students (100’s) 0.038 *** (0.010)
Pct. teachers with adv. degree -0.535 (0.490)
Adv. degree ⇥ Pct. adv. degree 0.961 (0.797)
Pct. teachers with NBPTS 0.185 (0.845)
NBPTS ⇥ Pct. NBPTS -0.626 (5.206)
Pct. teachers 0 to 2 years experience 0.834 (0.563)
Pct. teachers 3 to 10 years experience 1.110 ** (0.536)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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Figure C.4: “Push E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch at Current School
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
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Figure C.5: “Push E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black at Current School
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
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Figure C.6: “Push E↵ect” of $5,000 Increase in Salary at Current School
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
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Figure C.7: “Pull E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Lunch at All Other Schools
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
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Figure C.8: “Pull E↵ect” of 25 Percentage Point Increase in Pct. Black at All Other Schools
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
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Figure C.9: “Pull E↵ect” of $5,000 Increase in Salary at All Other Schools
(without unobserved heterogeneity)
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